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Renewable Energy and Trade: Meeting 
the Paris Agreement’s Goals Through a 
Two-Step Jurisprudential Advance  
Lisa Benjamin* 
Trade and climate change are at a crossroads. For the world 
to meet the long-term temperature goals under the Paris Agree-
ment, all nations must actively engage with greening their econ-
omies and energy supplies. The fastest way to achieve this is to 
allow, or even encourage, green industrial policies which incen-
tivize the manufacture and diffusion of renewable energy. These 
policies often include elements such as renewable portfolio stand-
ards, requirements for mixing biofuels with gasoline, as well as 
local content requirements. These types of policies are particu-
larly important and relevant for developing countries as they aim 
to reduce poverty, improve economic development, and mitigate 
the adverse effects of climate change. 
Where these policies include protectionist measures such as 
local content requirements, they violate basic World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) rules and principles of non-discrimination. 
Emerging economies in the developing world have been on the 
losing end of most of the recent energy disputes at the WTO, but 
are an increasingly large site of greenhouse gas emissions glob-
ally. Given the existing friction between the trade and climate 
change regimes, countries are likely to engage in strategic com-
pliance in order to preserve their domestic policy aims, at least in 
the short term. 
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One of the challenges facing policy makers in emerging econ-
omies at the intersection of climate and trade is how to dramati-
cally increase the manufacture, dissemination, and export of re-
newable energy technology through green industrial policy 
making without violating trade rules. This article proposes a two-
step jurisprudential advance to this problem. First, it highlights 
a broader range of defenses under Article XX available to emerg-
ing economies connected with the climate crisis. Second, it offers 
a set of general principles that the WTO’s own dispute settlement 
mechanism could introduce in the context of climate change. 
These solutions ultimately have broader import than just to de-
veloping countries (the locus of the case studies), as developed 
countries engage in their own industry policy battles and con-
sider implementing green new deals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Trade conflicts burgeoned under the Trump Administration, 
particularly with China. President Trump imposed tariffs on a 
number of imports, including solar cells, and engaged in trade 
conflicts with both allies and rivals of the United States in an 
attempt to revive ailing domestic manufacturing industries.1 At 
the same time, US states are implementing their own policies to 
incentivize the transition to renewable energy. Imagine a state 
allowed its power company to pay its customers for electricity 
those customers produced using renewable energy. The state 
then provided the power company credits against its public util-
ity commission taxes equal to the amounts it paid customers for 
renewable energy. Those customers could obtain additional in-
centive payments if they used solar inverters, solar modules, 
Stirling converters, or wind blades manufactured in that state 
to produce their renewable energy. Or imagine that a state pro-
vided a tax incentive for production of ethanol to be blended in 
gasoline, and required a minimum percentage of that ethanol to 
be produced from products originating from that state. Both of 
these programs incentivize the manufacture and diffusion of re-
newable energy, and assist the United States in tackling the 
problem of climate change. In fact, these are programs from 
Washington (the Renewable Energy Cost Recovery Incentives 
Payment Program) and Montana (Tax Incentive for Ethanol 
 
 1. TIMOTHY MEYER & GANESH SITARAMAN, A BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW 
AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 8 (2018). 
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Production), which were both held to violate trade rules in June 
2019.2 
This example demonstrates that the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO)3 and the new climate regime under the Paris Agree-
ment4 have conflicting aims. The WTO focuses on free trade, 
non-discrimination, and disciplining domestic protectionism, 
with limited policy exceptions provided to countries under Arti-
cle XX of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).5 
Article XX provides countries with several exceptions to allow 
discriminatory treatment which would otherwise violate WTO 
rules, including on the basis of environmental reasons (Article 
XX(g)) or health reasons (Article XX(b)).6 Under the Dispute Set-
tlement Mechanism of the WTO, parties have engaged in selec-
tive enforcement by only bringing suits against renewable en-
ergy domestic policies and not against fossil fuel subsidies.7 This 
selective enforcement imposes additional costs on renewable en-
ergy’s “ability to compete in the marketplace[,] and may slow the 
investment in [necessary] innovation,” and “subsidizes products 
with large social costs” such as fossil fuels.8 
The Paris Agreement aims to incentivize ambitious action 
by all countries at the national level to keep long-term tempera-
ture increases well below 2° C above pre-industrial levels (with 
an aspirational goal of 1.5° C) in order to avoid catastrophic cli-
mate change.9 Countries contribute to these collective goals 
 
 2. Panel Report, United States–Certain Measures Relating to the Renewa-
ble Energy Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS510/R (adopted June 27, 2019). The United 
States has appealed the decision. Joe Biden’s “Build Back Better Plan” focuses 
on manufacturing clean energy components domestically, illustrating that pro-
tectionist approaches to trade and renewable energy are not entirely partisan 
issues. The Biden Plan to Build a Modern, Sustainable Infrastructure and an 
Equitable Clean Energy Future, https://joebiden.com/clean-energy (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2021) [hereinafter Biden Energy Plan]. 
 3. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/ (last visited Sept. 
30, 2020). 
 4. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agree-
ment]. 
 5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinaf-
ter GATT 1994]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter WTO Agreement Annex 1A]. 
 6. GATT 1994, supra note 5. 
 7. Timothy Meyer, Free Trade, Fair Trade and Selective Enforcement, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 491, 494–95 (2018) [hereinafter Meyer, Free Trade]. 
 8. Id. at 497–98. 
 9. Paris Agreement, supra note 4, art. 2(a). 
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through the submission of nationally determined contributions, 
which are supposed to reflect decreasing greenhouse gas emis-
sions over time.10 The trade and climate change regimes exist 
within silos, but the systemic nature of climate change forces a 
reconsideration of the nexus between trade and climate change. 
Climate action at the national level is often implemented by de-
veloped and developing countries through green industrial pol-
icy making around energy,11 which as illustrated above, often in-
volves both environmental and economic and developmental 
objectives. Many of these policies have been on the losing end of 
disputes at the WTO, but arguably should be allowed under Ar-
ticle XX exceptions. These energy disputes demonstrate global 
wrangling to achieve economic dominance in clean energy indus-
tries. All of these disputes fall against a backdrop where liberal-
izing trade in clean energy is grounded in comparative ad-
vantage theory: removing barriers to international trade in 
theory would allow the most efficient, competitive producers of 
clean energy to prevail.12 
The first (albeit tentative) phase of the bilateral trade agree-
ment between the United States and China signals a further de-
cline in multilateral trade relationships under the WTO.13 
 
 10. Id. art. 3. 
 11. See, e.g., Brazil–Country Profile, GREEN FISCAL POL. NETWORK (Mar. 
30, 2017), https://greenfiscalpolicy.org/policy_briefs/brazil-country-profile-2/ 
(“Several national policies aimed at greening Brazil’s power sector have been 
launched, such as the Alternative Energy Source Incentive Program (PRO-
INFA), the National Energy Conservation Program (PROCEL), the National 
Program for the Rational Use of Oil and Natural Gas, the National Biodiesel 
Production, and Usage Program (PNBP).”). 
 12. Christopher M. Dent, Clean Energy Trade Governance: Reconciling 
Trade Liberalism and Climate Interventionism?, 23 NEW POL. ECON. 728, 730 
(2017). 
 13. Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, 
Jan. 15, 2020, U.N.T.S. forthcoming; Don Lee & Alice Su, US and China Agree 
to Partial Trade Deal, but Few Details Are Released, L.A.TIMES (Dec. 13, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-12-13/u-s-and-china-agree-to-
partial-trade-deal-but-few-details-are-released; Ryan Woo & Jeff Mason, 
China, US Sign Initial Trade Pact but Doubts and Tariffs Linger, REUTERS 
(Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china/china-u-s-
sign-initial-trade-pact-but-doubts-and-tariffs-linger-idUSKBN1ZE0I1; cf. Su-
sanne Droege, Harro van Asselt, Kasturi Das & Michael Mehling, The Trade 
System and Climate Action: Ways Forward Under the Paris Agreement CLIMATE 
STRATEGIES 4, 30 (Climate Strategies, Working Paper, Oct. 2016) (noting that 
“regional trade agreements are a promising way forward for introducing and 
testing new rules on climate and trade”); Kathleen Claussen, Dispute 
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Bilateral, regional and mega-regional trade arrangements have 
over the years led to the declining influence of the WTO. This 
decline, combined with the blocking by the United States of the 
appointment of appellate judges in the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (DSM),14 mean that the ability (and relevance) of the 
DSM to adjudicate multilateral trade disputes is now question-
able.15 These developments may lead developing (and developed) 
countries to engage in or continue existing strategic compliance 
(delaying compliance until trade remedies are imminent). The 
trade remedies phase at the WTO can take a long time to com-
plete, and so the system provides ample opportunities for coun-
tries to engage in strategic compliance. This provides countries 
with economic and policy space to pursue goals they consider to 
be the most beneficial to them nationally. This strategic compli-
ance approach is often motivated by a convenient compliance ap-
proach (complying only when it is convenient and benefits exist-
ing domestic policies). Finally, countries may simply ignore the 
outcome of disputes and never comply, and instead employ more 
domestic protectionist measures to implement and entrench do-
mestic green industrial policy making. 
While these approaches could have some climate benefits 
where countries’ green industrial policies have demonstrable cli-
mate impacts, they also undermine the multilateral system of 
trade. This could lead to escalating trade conflicts and a de-em-
phasis on multilateral trade rules, which could spill over to 
 
Settlement Under the Next Generation of Free Trade Agreements, 46 GA. J. INTL. 
& COMP. L. 661, 615 (2018) (noting that “[r]egional and bilateral agreements 
have eclipsed the WTO in importance”). The first phase of the agreement con-
tains a bilateral dispute settlement mechanism designed to avoid disputes be-
ing submitted to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
 14. Jens Lehne, Crisis at the WTO: Is the Blocking of Appeals to the WTO 
Appellate Body by the United States Legally Justified?, in 6 SUI GENERIS 3 (Dan-
iel Hürlimann & Marc Thommen eds., 2019) (asserting that US arguments of 
judicial overreach and disregard of the WTO rules by Appellate Body judges 
used to block appointments to the Appellate Body since mid-2017 are not legally 
justifiable). As of December 2019, the number of Appellate Body judges dropped 
to one, below the three required for a quorum. Id. at 133–34; see also Press Re-
lease, World Trade Organization, Members Reiterate Joint Call to Launch Se-
lection Process for Appellate Body Members (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/dsb_22nov19_e.htm. 
 15. A number of countries have agreed to an ad-hoc workaround to the cur-
rent stasis. See Beatriz Rios, China, WTO Members Join EU’s Ad-Hoc Appellate 
Body in Davos, EURACTIV (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.euractiv.com/section/
economy-jobs/news/china-wto-members-join-eus-ad-hoc-appellate-body-in-da-
vos/. 
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political conflicts; failure to align the WTO and UNFCCC re-
gimes could also undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
both the trade and climate regimes. Conversely, efforts within 
the trade regime to “promote sustainability as well as eliminate 
poverty, reduce income inequality, protect workers, and advance 
public health might well help to rebuild confidence in trade as a 
pathway to a better future.”16 
Developing countries hold more than half of the world’s re-
newable energy capacity,17 and they are anticipated to bear the 
brunt of the impacts of climate change.18 Given that the out-
comes of most of the DSM disputes on energy have been negative 
for developing and developed countries so far, in the short term 
strategic compliance may not be so detrimental for the climate if 
countries implement urgent and progressive renewable energy 
policies. In the longer term, if the WTO and its DSM is reinvig-
orated, a more synergistic relationship between trade and cli-
mate change is needed in order to reduce the existing friction 
between these two regimes. Part of a revised relationship be-
tween trade and climate change could be achieved jurispruden-
tially through the DSM. The existing dispute mechanism has the 
flexibility to accommodate emerging global issues and cater its 
jurisprudence accordingly, within the limits of the language of 
the WTO agreements. In fact, Article XX has previously been 
 
 16. Daniel C. Esty & Susan Biniaz, Introduction to COOL HEADS IN A WARM-
ING WORLD: HOW TRADE POLICY CAN HELP FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE vii, (Daniel 
Esty & Susan Biniaz eds., Yale Ctr. Envtl. L. & Pol., 2019), https://envirocen-
ter.yale.edu/cool-heads-warming-world-how-trade-policy-can-help-fight-cli-
mate-change. 
 17. See RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 
GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 4 (2010), https://www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/
activities/gsr/REN21_GSR_2010_full_revised%20Sept2010.pdf (discussing gov-
ernmental utilization of renewables); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLI-
MATE CHANGE (IPCC), RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
MITIGATION: SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 9 (2013), https://www.ipcc.ch/re-
port/renewable-energy-sources-and-climate-change-mitigation/ (“Collectively, 
developing countries host 53% of global [renewable energy] electricity genera-
tion capacity.”). 
 18. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 15–16 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-re-
port/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf; Ilona M. Otto et al., Social Vulnera-
bility to Climate Change: A Review of Concepts and Evidence, 17 REG’L ENV’T 
CHANGE 1651, 1658 (2017) (discussing the effects of climate change on vulner-
able communities); David J. Wrathall et al., Problematising Loss and Damage, 
8 INT’L J. GLOB. WARMING 274, 282–85 (2015) (discussing monetary compensa-
tion difficulties in traditional and indigenous societies). 
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subject to progressive interpretation by the DSM,19 and there is 
no reason why this approach cannot be adopted in disputes in-
volving renewable energy. This paper suggests a two-step juris-
prudential approach that could be adopted by both developing 
countries and the DSM. 
It is at the nexus of climate change and trade that this paper 
focuses on emerging economies in the developing world through 
the lens of energy disputes at the WTO. The actions of these 
countries in the context of both climate change and energy are 
critical to global energy transitions and climate stabilization ef-
forts anticipated by the Paris Agreement. Emerging economies 
such as BASIC countries20 are introducing public stimulus pro-
grams and making investments in infrastructure, rural develop-
ment, and urban planning in order to achieve green growth. 
While increased incorporation of renewables into domestic elec-
tricity grids is an important part of the energy transition, this 
paper focuses on manufacture, implementation, and diffusion of 
green technology, which also faces many hurdles.21 
 
 19. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: 
GATT Exceptions, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_ex-
ceptions_e.htm (noting that Article XX has been interpreted to allow “measures 
that are inconsistent with GATT disciplines,” such as “policies aimed at reduc-
ing the consumption of cigarettes, protecting dolphins, reducing risks to human 
health posed by asbestos, [and] reducing risks to human, animal and plant life 
and health arising from the accumulation of waste tyres [sic]”) (last visited Oct. 
12, 2020). 
 20. BASIC countries are four newly industrialized countries which still 
self-identify as developing countries under most international treaties: Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China. Defining the groupings of non-industrialized 
countries in the world has been subject to much debate. The terms “Third 
World,” “developing world,” and “Global South” originated in different periods 
and have been contested in terms of their appropriateness and accuracy. Today, 
the terms “Global South” and “Global North” have become the favored option by 
scholars and policy makers, based on an earlier “North-South” distinction of the 
1980s with the prefix “global” clarifying that this is not a purely geographical 
categorization of the world, but one based on economic inequalities. See SYLVIA 
CHANT & CATHY MCILWAINE, GEOGRAPHIES OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBAL SOUTH 6, 11 (2009) (discussing the 
different methods of classifying areas of the world). This paper will continue to 
use the terms “developed” and “developing countries” as these terms are identi-
fied and used in the WTO system. 
 21. Electricity markets are predominantly local, crossing borders between 
countries where significant grid infrastructure exists or could be built and so 
are subject to physical restraints, but renewable energy technology is a more 
global market and traded across borders and so is more vulnerable to WTO 
trade disciplines. Ilaria Espa & Gracia Marín Durán, Renewable Energy 
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Environmental externalities are not well reflected in markets, 
there is inadequate information on products, and behavioral bar-
riers persist.22 In addition, continuous reinvestment in non-
green infrastructure can lead to path dependency on fossil fuels 
and challenges regarding sources of finance.23 Lock-in of fossil 
fuel technology and infrastructure as well as market failures are 
difficult to surmount.24 
This paper takes a novel approach by examining the strate-
gies of emerging economies at the WTO across a set of disputes 
which fall into two main categories: renewable energy and bio-
fuels. Very few academics have explored these renewable energy 
disputes through the lens of climate change, and even fewer from 
the perspective of developing countries. The record of success of 
developing countries in these disputes is mixed, although largely 
unsuccessful both in law and “in fact” (in terms of trade reme-
dies). This paper will suggest some understandings of why this 
may be the case, based on inherent inadequacies of the trade 
system to accommodate climate objectives, and how these inad-
equacies could be overcome. 
While this paper focuses on emerging economies, the analy-
sis has relevance for developed economies as well, as they con-
sider their own form of domestic protectionism, green industrial 
policy making, and green new deals (for example, see Joe Biden’s 
“Build Back Better” platform).25 The nature of energy disputes 
has shifted over time. Energy policies of developed countries are 
also becoming subject to the DSM. India recently won a panel 
decision regarding renewable energy regulations in California, 
Minnesota, Texas, Montana, Michigan, Washington, and 
 
Subsidies and WTO Law: Time to Rethink the Case for Reform and Beyond Can-
ada–Renewable Energy/Fit Program, 21 J. Int’l Econ. L. 625–26 (2018). 
 22. Rene Kemp & Babette Never, Green Transition, Industrial Policy, and 
Economic Development, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 66, 66 (2017) (discussing 
challenges of developing and implementing green technologies in both industri-
alized and developing nations). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 67. 
 25. See, e.g., Biden Energy Plan, supra note 2; Recognizing the Duty of the 
Federal Government to Create a Green New Deal, H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. 
(2019) (calling for the creation of a Green New Deal); Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
gions: The European Green Deal, COM (2019) 640 final (Dec. 11, 2019) (calling 
for and proposing a European Green Deal). 
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Delaware found to be in violation of WTO rules.26 Given the 
largely negative outcomes of these disputes for renewable energy 
and in particular the problem of discriminatory local content re-
quirements, a “pause” in these disputes due to the decline of the 
DSM may be beneficial for the climate, providing policy space to 
countries to use local content requirements and other protection-
ist policies to ramp up climate action and green energy develop-
ment. Domestic protectionist policies, including subsidies, if well 
designed, could (and already have)27 decrease costs and increase 
the production and diffusion of renewable energy both domesti-
cally and around the world, including in other developing coun-
tries. Assuming the WTO and the DSM continue to operate in 
the longer term, energy disputes are only likely to increase and 
so a more synergistic relationship between the WTO and the 
Paris Agreement will be needed. Countries can (and do) unilat-
erally impose countervailing and other duties which increase the 
cost of imports of renewable energy and hamper its diffusion, 
and so a more comprehensive approach to energy and climate 
concerns at the WTO will be needed if we are to meet the goals 
of the Paris Agreement.28 
 
 26. United States—Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy 
Sector, supra note 2. Meyer argues that it is in fact developed countries that are 
“clamoring for policy space” in the trading system as they are unable to provide 
direct subsidies via a centralized, state-based banking system as China can. See 
Timothy Meyer, The Law and Politics of Socially Inclusive Trade, 2019 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 33, 42 (2019) (discussing the negative impact on trade institutions from 
developed countries failure to deal with economic inequalities). 
 27. INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, A NEW WORLD: THE 
GEOPOLITICS OF THE ENERGY TRANSFORMATION (2019) (summarizing efforts 
and changes in energy transformation and noting a steep decline in the cost of 
renewable energy); REN21, RENEWABLES 2019 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT (2019) 
(summarizing renewable energy efforts and data from around the world). 
 28. Brian Eckhouse, Ari Natter & Chris Martin, Trump’s Tariffs on Solar 
Mark Biggest Blow to Renewables Yet, BLOOMBERG: CLIMATE CHANGED (Jan. 
23, 2018, 3:38 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-22/
trump-taxes-solar-imports-in-biggest-blow-to-clean-energy-yet (discussing tar-
iffs imposed on solar products); Graeme Wearden, China Fuels Trade War Fears 
With New Tariffs on US Goods—As it Happened, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2018/apr/04/china-us-trade-war-
tariffs-wpp-markets-eurozone-jobs-business-live (summarizing the timeline of 
events China took in response to US tariffs signalling a potential trade war 
between the US and China); Doug Palmer, Trump’s Global Trade War, POLIT-
ICO (May 31, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-duties-steel-
aluminum-global-trade-war (discussing the negative impacts to US manufac-
turers and consumers, and ally relationships, newly imposed tariffs have). 
2020] RENEWABLE ENERGY AND TRADE 11 
 
While legislative reform at the WTO has been suggested and 
would certainly be a more comprehensive approach, this paper 
suggests a partial solution through a twofold jurisprudential ap-
proach, assuming the appellate function of the DSM is revived. 
In the first instance, existing disputes can provide lessons to de-
veloping countries on how to better cater and craft their domes-
tic policies to more easily align with existing defenses available 
under Article XX in the context of the climate crisis. At the same 
time, Article XX should be reinterpreted by panels, and the Ap-
pellate Body, to allow more policy space for countries to imple-
ment and diffuse green energy technology (even with local con-
tent requirements), and so reduce the friction between the WTO 
and the Paris Agreement. 
This paper is structured as follows: in section one, a brief 
overview of the WTO, DSM, and Article XX is provided as back-
ground for the analysis of the renewable energy disputes covered 
in the paper. In section two, the relationship between energy, 
trade, and climate change is expanded upon, paving the way, in 
section three, for a historical background of the relationship be-
tween energy and the WTO and green industrial policy making. 
This background provides context for why the legislative gap in 
terms of energy exists at the WTO, and explains why disputes 
around renewable energy have arisen through the DSM. As the 
need for energy transitions towards renewables becomes more 
urgent in the context of the climate crisis, the inability of the 
WTO to cater for these renewable energy disputes through the 
lens of climate change becomes a pressing issue. The traditional 
trade approach to renewables may impede their development 
and lead to more strategic or convenient compliance by states. 
Section four will analyze the strategies used by India and China 
in renewable energy disputes, and Argentina and Indonesia in 
biofuels disputes. These countries’ approach to green industrial 
policy making and climate change are critically important if the 
world is to meet the global temperature goals in the Paris Agree-
ment, and the domestic policies of these countries have been dis-
puted at the WTO. India included local content requirements for 
solar panels as part of its Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mis-
sion,29 and China provided subsidies to state owned enterprises 
 
 29. Dispute Settlement, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells 
and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. D.S.456, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e
/dispu_e/cases_e/ds456_e.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2020) (discussing India’s con-
tent requirements for solar panels and subsequent WTO action). 
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manufacturing wind towers and solar panels.30 Argentina and 
Indonesia imposed export duties on locally produced raw mate-
rials used to manufacture biofuels in order to make their domes-
tically produced biofuels cheaper on the international markets.31 
The paper will conclude with a focus specifically on how existing 
defenses under Article XX are being relied upon in these dis-
putes, and evaluate the circumstances under which these coun-
tries could tighten their domestic policies in the context of the 
climate emergency to more closely align with Article XX defenses 
such as XX(b) and (g).32 It will also advocate for a more climate-
friendly interpretation of Article XX by the DSM. 
I. THE WTO, DSM, AND ARTICLE XX 
The WTO was formally established as an institution in 
1995,33 although its historical roots go back much further in 
 
 30. Chen Gang, China’s Solar PV Manufacturing and Subsidies from the 
Perspective of State Capitalism, 33 COPENHAGEN J. ASIAN STUDIES 90, 97–100 
(2015) (discussing China’s subsidies of wind and solar manufacturers to spur 
increased production). 
 31. See generally Philip Blenkinsop & Gabriel Burin, Argentina Says 
Clinches Deal to Resume Biodiesel Exports to EU, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2019, 
9:48AM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-biodiesel-argentina/argentina-
says-clinches-deal-to-resume-biodiesel-exports-to-eu-idUSKCN1PO25B (dis-
cussing the implications of and subsequent actions relating to Argentine export 
duties on biodiesel); Philip Blenkinsop, EU Hits Indonesian Biodiesel With Im-
port Duties Over Subsidies, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2019, 8:16AM), https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-eu-indonesia-biodiesel/eu-hits-indonesian-biodiesel-with-
import-duties-over-subsidies-idUSKBN1YD1HG (discussing subsequent EU 
action in response to Indonesian subsidies). 
 32. GATT 1994, supra note 5, at para. B (discussing the “necessary to pro-
tect human, animal, or plant life or health” defense); and para. G (discussing 
the “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” defense). 
 33. The WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/thewto_e/history_e/history_e.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2020). 
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time.34 The agreement establishing the WTO35 includes, in its 
annexes, a number of agreements referred to as “covered agree-
ments,” although they are not stand-alone agreements.36 Coun-
tries accede to the WTO as a single-package deal, agreeing to all 
of the multilateral covered agreements. These include agree-
ments on the trade in goods, including the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT 1994), the Agreement on Agricul-
ture (AoA), the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures agree-
ment (SCM), Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA), and the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS).37 The 
member states of the WTO must adhere to the provisions of all 
of these multilateral covered agreements. 
The institutional architecture of the WTO includes a robust 
DSM. Despite the declining influence of the WTO in recent 
years, the DSM is still critical to its operation. The DSM provides 
binding interpretive approaches of the main ‘covered agree-
ments’ of the WTO. Some major subject areas of these agree-
ments, which are relevant to this paper, include agreements on 
subsidies, agriculture, investment, and trade in goods and ser-
vices. The DSM applies to all of these agreements. The interpre-
tations the DSM provides are integral to the operation of the 
WTO and parties’ compliance with it. 
There are a number of possible exceptions to the provisions 
of WTO covered agreements, including waivers agreed on by the 
parties under GATT Article XXV,38 exceptions for developing 
countries in Article XVIII,39 and most importantly for this paper, 
 
 34. The precursor to the WTO was the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs in 1947. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. However, the principles of multilateral 
trade relationships were established as a result of bilateral friendship, com-
merce, and navigation treaties between independent nations in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, resulting in the 1890 treaty Concerning the Creation 
of an International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs. See JOHN H. 
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 35 (2d ed. 1997). The provisions of 
GATT 1947 evolved from US bilateral trade agreements. Id. at 37. Claussen 
notes that trade provisions adapt and evolve from other trading agreements and 
in the labor and environmental fields can achieve normative convergence. 
Claussen, supra note 13 at 615. 
 35. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
 36. JACKSON, supra note 34, at 46–47. 
 37. See WTO Agreement Annex 1A, supra note 5. 
 38. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XXV. 
 39. Id. art. XVIII. 
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general exceptions included under Article XX of the GATT 
1994.40 As there is no international environmental court, how 
the DSM interprets these exceptions, particularly exceptions re-
lated to public health and the environment, is critically im-
portant to how states will implement provisions and commit-
ments under international environmental treaties,41 including 
in relation to climate change. For example, article 3.5 of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)42 reiterates the language of Article XX of the 
GATT,43 and the Paris Agreement is silent on trade44 so parties 
largely depend on trade provisions to regulate their domestic cli-
mate and energy related policies.45 While several WTO parties 
have begun work on a plurilateral agreement on Climate 
Change, Trade, and Sustainability,46 more uniform and urgent 
action is needed on this issue. Significant precedent exists for 
progressive interpretations of Article XX under the DSM in the 
context of trade and the environment, and this history of the 
DSM demonstrates the “generative quality” of that body47 and 
its ability to adapt to changing global circumstances. 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is considered 
to be the “linchpin” of the entire trading system, and one of the 
 
 40. Id. art. XX. 
 41. CHRIS WOLD, SANFORD GAINES & GREG BLOCK, TRADE AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT: LAW AND POLICY 83 (2d ed. 2011). 
 42. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
 43. Compare id. art. 3.5 (“Measures taken to combat climate change, in-
cluding unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”), with 
GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX (prohibiting measures “which would consti-
tute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade”). 
 44. Paris Agreement, supra note 4. 
 45. DANIEL BODANSKY, JUTTA BRUNNÉE & LAVANYA RAJAMANI, INTERNA-
TIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 347 (2017) (summarizing the different bodies of 
law surrounding international climate change and how each country uses 
them). 
 46. Ronald Steenblick and Susanne Droege, Time to ACCTS? Five Coun-
tries Announce New Initiative On Trade And Climate Change, INT’L INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Sep. 25, 2019), https://www.iisd.org/articles/time-accts-
five-countries-announce-new-initiative-trade-and-climate-change. 
 47. Andreas Klasen, Trade: Gridlock and Resilience, in BEYOND GRIDLOCK 
74 (Thomas Hale & David Held eds., 2017) (discussing the benefits and detri-
ments of the DSM). 
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greatest achievements of the Uruguay Round which led to the 
agreement of the WTO.48 It is a unified system which adjudicates 
disputes between parties under any of the multilateral agree-
ments. It provides the right of any government to have a panel 
process49 and panel decision initiated, as well as an appellate 
procedure.50 The dispute settlement body (DSB) administers the 
entire process,51 and the WTO system eliminates the ability of 
parties to block adoption of panel or appellate body decisions, 
providing for a level of “automaticity”52 and therefore certainty. 
Together the system is referred to here as the Dispute Settle-
ment Mechanism or DSM. 
A panel consists of three independent trade experts,53 and 
the Appellate Body consists of a permanent body of seven judges, 
with a minimum of three required for the body to operate.54 Once 
a dispute has been adjudicated and appealed, the DSM also pro-
vides for a remedies phase of the dispute. While voluntary com-
pensation can be provided under Article 22 of the DSU,55 this 
has never been used. Instead, countries will usually seek author-
ization to suspend concessions or other obligations under the 
same or another WTO covered agreement.56 This can include im-
posing tariffs equal to any benefits lost as a result of the other 
country’s noncompliance.57 The level of suspension can also be 
subject to arbitration under the DSM,58 although the remedy 
phase of the DSM can be lengthy. 
 
 48. JACKSON, supra note 34, at 124. 
 49. Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 6, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter 
DSU]; see also id., art. 12 (establishing the procedural rules governing the panel 
process). 
 50. Id. art. 17. 
 51. Id. art. 2. 
 52. JACKSON, supra note 34, at 125. 
 53. DSU, supra note 49, art. 8. 
 54. Id., art. 17. The appellate body must only review issues of law covered 
by the panel. Id. 
 55. Id. art. 22. 
 56. See e.g., Panel Report, United States–Import Measures on Certain Prod-
ucts from the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS165/AB/R (Dec. 11, 
2000) (summarizing the arguments made in favor for and against suspension of 
concessions for US imports of certain European commodities). 
 57. DSU, supra note 49, art. 22. 
 58. Id. 
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The United States started to block the appointment of new 
appellate judges in 2018, with terms of two of the remaining 
three judges expiring on December 10, 2019.59 This move is 
partly a reaction to the “barrage of disputes” being initiated 
against the US due to its tariff wars, and partly due to disap-
pointment by the US administration with the outcome of previ-
ous disputes.60 The inability of the appellate body to function 
nullifies the appellate procedure of the system, and could signal 
the “beginning of the end” of the DSM, an increase in tariffs, and 
trading relations based on power as opposed to multilaterally 
agreed rules.61 Despite this new controversy, the DSM has not 
been without its flaws, and has been criticized in the past specif-
ically in relation to its inaccessibility by developing countries.62 
A. ARTICLE XX – GENERAL EXCEPTIONS 
Article XX exceptions act as a safety valve in the WTO sys-
tem, providing discretion to countries to avoid existing trade re-
quirements such as national treatment or most favoured nation 
provisions, if national priorities justify such deviations.63 Only 
some national priorities are exempted from trade disciplines, 
and these are reflected in the language of the Article XX.64 They 
include exceptions for public health or environmental reasons.65 
These exceptions provide policy discretion to member states of 
the WTO, provided those states meet the requirements laid out 
in Article XX, as interpreted by the DSM. These exceptions could 
 
 59. Sabri Ben-Achour, The Top Body at the WTO is About to Stop Function-
ing, MARKETPLACE (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.marketplace.org/2019/12/05/
the-top-body-wto-stop-functioning/ (arguing the US blocking appointments will 
end the functionality of the WTO appellate body). 
 60. Tom Miles, US Blocks WTO Judge Reappointment as Dispute Settle-
ment Crisis Looms, REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-trade-wto-idUSKCN1LC19O (discussing the possible reasoning and im-
plications of the US decision to bock reappointment). 
 61. WTO Judge Blockage Could Prove “The Beginning of the End,” DW 
(Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.dw.com/en/wto-judge-blockage-could-prove-the-be-
ginning-of-the-end/a-51613082. 
 62. See, e.g., Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settle-
ment and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 
8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 861, 863 (2005) (“Our starting point is that there is likely to 
be substantial ‘missing’ WTO dispute settlement activity related to developing 
country trading interests.”). 
 63. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(b). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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provide critical pathways for developing countries to implement 
green industrial policies which have climate benefits. 
Existing trade disciplines under the WTO covered agree-
ments include national treatment and most favored nations pro-
visions which aim to ensure non-discrimination between WTO 
member states. Non-discrimination has been called the “cardinal 
legal principle of the GATT.”66 The principle appears most prom-
inently in the “most favored nation” clause (under Article I)67 
and the “national treatment” clause (under Article III) of the 
GATT.68 Under “most favored nation,” no member state of the 
WTO can afford preferential treatment to a product of one WTO 
member unless it offers that same treatment to the “like” prod-
ucts of all WTO members.69 “National treatment” is the most rel-
evant in terms of subsidies for renewable energy. Under these 
provisions, a WTO member cannot treat its own domestic prod-
uct more favorably than any “like” product of any other WTO 
member.70 
Article XX71 provides countries with a number of general ex-
ceptions which can exempt actions which violate “most favored 
nation” or “national treatment” principles.72 Application of 
 
 66. WOLD et al., supra note 41, at 32. 
 67. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. I. 
 68. Id. art. III. 
 69. WOLD et al., supra note 41, at 180. Article I of the GATT states that no 
advantage or privilege can be offered, see GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. I, and 
there is extensive jurisprudence at the DSM of what constitutes a “like” product. 
In the environmental realm, whether product and production methods consti-
tute a “like” product is a difficult area. See, e.g., CHRISTIANE R. CONRAD, PRO-
CESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS (PPMS) IN WTO LAW: INTERFACING TRADE 
AND SOCIAL GOALS (2011) (discussing the definitions and characteristics of 
“like” products under the WTO). 
 70. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. I & III (illustrating that the jurispru-
dence on “like” products under both most favored nation and national treatment 
have been provided with interchangeable applicability). 
 71. Id. art. XX. 
 72. This paper provides a brief overview only of cases on Article XX, while 
acknowledging that there is significant literature on the application and inter-
pretation of Article XX in the context of climate change. See, e.g., GARY CLYDE 
HUFBAUER, STEVE CHARNOVITZ & JISUN KIM, GLOBAL WARMING AND THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 86–87 (2009); Luca Rubini & Ingrid Jegou, Who’ll Stop 
the Rain? Allocating Emissions Allowances for Free: Environmental Policy, Eco-
nomics, and WTO Subsidy Law, 1 TRANSNAT’L EVN’T L. 325, 345 (2012); TRACEY 
EPPS & ANDREW GREEN, RECONCILING TRADE AND CLIMATE: HOW THE WTO 
CAN HELP ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 144–47 (2010); Thomas Cottier & 
Tetyana Payosova, Common Concern and the Legitimacy of the WTO in Dealing 
with Climate Change, in 9 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
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Article XX involves a two-step process. The measures taken by a 
country must fall under one of the sub-categories of Article XX, 
and then must meet the requirements of the opening paragraph 
(or “chapeau”) of Article XX.73 
Trade and environment disputes at the WTO faced a num-
ber of criticisms in the 1990s, largely as a result of the 
Tuna/Dolphin74 dispute where the United States attempted to 
impose environmental restrictions on fisheries imports by plac-
ing an embargo on tuna imports which were caught using purse 
seine nets. These nets lead to high levels of dolphin mortality. 
WTO decisions in this area fueled protests at the 1999 Ministe-
rial Conference in Seattle, with protesters wearing costumes of 
turtles and dolphins.75 Developing countries saw these environ-
mental requirements as “eco-imperialism,”76 which served to 
hamper their exports, and as protectionism by developed coun-
tries clothed in environmental regulations. Perhaps in response 
to these criticisms, the DSM developed more environmentally-
friendly approaches under Articles XX(b) and XX(g).77 
 
TRADE LAW 28 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2016); Michael Hertel, Climate-
Change-Related Trade Measures and Article XX: Defining Discrimination in 
Light of the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, 45 J. 
WORLD TRADE 653 (2011); JACOB WERKSMAN & TREVOR G. HOUSER, COMPETI-
TIVENESS, LEAKAGE AND COMPARABILITY: DISCIPLINING THE USE OF TRADE 
MEASURES UNDER A POST-2012 CLIMATE AGREEMENT 3–4 (2008). 
 73. WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: GATT Exceptions, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2020) (providing a general guidance on performing analysis 
under GATT Article XX) [hereinafter WTO Rules]. 
 74. See Panel Report, United States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS29/R (unadopted June 16, 1994) (finding the US restrictions were 
not justifiable under Article XX(g) as measures relating to the conservation of 
dolphins); see also Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 
12, 1998) (concluding that the US ban fails to meet the requirements of the 
chapeau of Article XX). There are a number of iterations of these disputes. 
 75. While part of the protests concerned DSM decisions concluding that the 
US restrictions were discriminatory, much of the protests concerned the nega-
tive impacts of free trade generally, workers’ rights, sustainability, environmen-
tal as well as social issues. See, e.g., World Trade Organization Protests in Se-
attle, SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.seattle.gov/cityarchives/exhibits-and-
education/digital-document-libraries/world-trade-organization-protests-in-se-
attle (last visited Sept. 20, 2020). 
 76. BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 45, at 335 (pointing out that developing 
countries have expressed the concern that environmental requirements in trade 
are “eco-imperialism”). 
 77. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(b) & (g). 
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The two main “environmental” subcategories under Article 
XX are XX(b) and XX(g).78 Article XX(b) provides an exception 
for measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
or health . . . .”79 Article XX(g) provides an exception for 
measures “relating to conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption . . . .”80 
There are several other subcategories of Article XX which have 
been invoked in energy disputes, including Article XX(d) which 
exempts measures “necessary” to comply with laws or regula-
tions, and Article XX(j) which exempts measures aimed at pro-
tecting products which are locally in short supply.81 The lan-
guage in the subcategories differs significantly, with some 
measures required to be “necessary” (e.g., XX(b) and (d)), while 
others must just “relate to” the domestic measure (e.g., XX(g)).82 
B. ARTICLE XX(b) 
Public health is one of the most protected areas in domestic 
policy making, and is highly related to both climate change and 
the current COVID-19 health crisis. Climate change exacerbates 
the health impacts of air pollution, and affects some of the most 
vulnerable communities worldwide.83 The disproportionate im-
pact of the COVID-19 crisis has raised public consciousness of 
the burdens placed on poor and vulnerable communities.84 This 
 
 78.  The Relationship Between MEAs and WTO Rules, [2003] 2 Trade Env’t 
Rev. 104, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2003/4 (“It has become widely ac-
cepted that GATT Article XX (General Exception), and particularly paragraphs 
(b) and (g), provides WTO Member with considerable leeway to protect the en-
vironment.”). 
 79. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(b). 
 80. Id. art. XX(g). 
 81. Id. art. XX(d) & (j). 
 82. Compare id. art. XX(b), and id. art. XX(d), with id. art. XX(g). 
 83. See Myles Allen et al., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE [IPCC], Summary for Policymakers, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. AN 
IPCC SPECIAL REPORT 12 (V. Masson-Delmotte et al eds., 2018), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_re-
port_LR.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B8Q-GK4D]; Bruce Bekker et al. ASSOCIATION 
OF AIR POLLUTION AND HEAT EXPOSURE WITH PRETERM BIRTH, LOW BIRTH 
WEIGHT AND STILLBIRTH IN THE US. A SYSTEMIC REVIEW, Environmental 
Health (2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarti-
cle/2767260. 
 84. Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Jul. 24, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/race-
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is also the case in developing countries. Due to its critical rela-
tionship with sovereignty and government functions, public 
health under Article XX(b), has been afforded the most interpre-
tive deference to domestic policy making by the DSM. 
There are different applicable tests for these subcategories. 
In order to be “necessary” under Article XX(b), a country must 
not have alternative measures which are reasonably available 
and not inconsistent with the GATT.85 Article XX(g) requires cor-
ollary activity of restrictions on domestic production and con-
sumption, requiring that countries display some domestic envi-
ronmental activity.86 Two disputes which concerned an import 
ban on asbestos by France87 and an import ban on tires by Bra-
zil88 provided generous interpretations of Article XX(b). In these 
cases, domestic policies designed to reduce risk from asbestos fi-
bers and mosquito-born diseases respectively were held to fall 
within the subcategory of Article XX(b), even though alterna-
tives were available. The Appellate Body afforded significant 
deference to domestic policy making, specifically recognizing 
that complex public health or environmental problems such as 
climate change must be tackled with multifaceted and compre-
hensive policies with interacting measures, the results of which 
may only manifest over time.89 The import ban on retreaded 
tires was considered in the broader context of Brazil’s compre-
hensive strategy to deal with waste tires, and the Appellate Body 
 
ethnicity.html (“Inequities in the social determinants of health, such as poverty 
and healthcare access, affecting these groups are interrelated and influence a 
wide range of health and quality-of-life outcomes and risks.”). 
 85. E.g., United States–Tuna, supra note 74, at ¶ 5.35 (confirming that the 
term “necessary” in Article XX(b) means a contracting party has no available 
alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which 
is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions); see also Panel Report, United 
States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 6.26–6.29 
WTO Doc. WT/DS2/9, (adopted May 20, 1996) (finding the US baseline estab-
lishment method not “necessary” under Article XX(b)). 
 86. See WTO Rules, supra note 73 (“[I]n order to be justified under Article 
XX(g), a measure affecting imports must be applied ‘in conjunction with re-
strictions on domestic production or consumption’ (the even-handedness re-
quirement).”). 
 87. Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/R (adopted Sept. 18, 
2000). 
 88. Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Measuring Affecting Imports of Re-
treaded Tyres, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007). 
 89. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 151 (admitting that the import ban tackles certain 
complex public health or environmental problems). 
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determined that the import ban did make a material contribu-
tion to Brazil’s overall domestic objectives.90 In Brazil–Taxation, 
the Panel specifically articulated that a policy to reduce carbon 
emissions would be covered by Article XX(b), as it would be a 
policy designed to protect human life or health.91 While the ele-
ments of a renewable energy policy targeted at preserving a sta-
ble climate are likely to qualify under Article XX(b), economic 
elements under the same policy such as local content require-
ments may not be considered a legitimate objective,92 and may 
not be considered “necessary” as set out below. 
Existing jurisprudence points to three elements which are 
relied upon to determine whether a measure is “necessary” un-
der Article XX(b). These include whether the measure is apt to 
make a “material contribution” to the purpose of the policy.93 A 
genuine relationship of ends and means should be identified for 
this element.94 Therefore both the renewable energy policy and 
any protectionist economic measures within it should materially 
contribute to emissions reductions. This is where empirical evi-
dence put forward by a country of reduced costs and increased 
dissemination from past local content or other economic ele-
ments could be persuasive, even if these occurred over time. The 
Brazil–Retreaded Tyres case gave specific latitude to complex 
public health or environmental problems such as climate 
change, stating that the benefits of policies may only manifest 
over time.95 
The second element of the test of necessity is whether the 
measure is proportional to the values the policy seeks to pro-
tect—the more vital the interests or values, the easier it would 
 
 90. Id. at ¶ 154 (“[W]e wish to underscore that the Import Ban must be 
viewed in the broader context of the comprehensive strategy designed and im-
plemented by Brazil to deal with waste tyres.”). 
 91. Panel Report, Brazil–Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and 
Charges, ¶ 7.880, WTO Doc. WT/DS472/R (adopted Aug. 30, 2017). 
 92. See Michael A. Mehling et al., Designing Border Carbon Adjustments 
for Enhanced Climate Action, 113:3 AM. J. INT’L L. 433, 465 (2019) (“By contrast 
[to the reduction of CO2 emissions], an economic rationale . . . would not be con-
sidered a legitimate objective under the exceptions of Article XX(b).”). 
 93. See Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, supra note 88, at ¶¶ 151, 210 (describing 
the conditions under which an import ban would be permissible under GATT 
Article XX(b) and held to materially contribute to achieving an objective). 
 94. See id. at ¶ 145 (examining whether “there is a genuine relationship of 
ends and means between the objective pursued and the measure at issue”). 
 95. Id. at ¶151; Mehling et al., supra note 92, at 465. 
22 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 22:1 
 
be to pass the necessity test.96 The urgency and global attention 
focused on climate change, the increasing public health emer-
gencies associated with the impacts of climate change, including 
increased air pollution, and COVID-19, combined with multilat-
eral and almost universal action to ratify the Paris Agreement,97 
suggest that a policy targeted at addressing climate change 
would pass this second element.98 
The third element requires that there is no alternative 
measure which would achieve the same aim but in a less trade-
restrictive manner.99 Here the burden shifts to the complainant 
in a dispute.100 The Appellate Body has been careful to consider 
practice and economic needs of developing countries in the con-
text of this third element. In Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, expensive 
technological fixes such as tire recycling facilities were not rea-
sonably available, and therefore the domestic policy of promot-
ing domestic retreading of tires was deemed to be “necessary” 
under Article XX(b).101 The economic and administrative reali-
ties of countries were carefully considered by the DSM in the 
context of the comprehensiveness and different components of 
the policy. 
C. ARTICLE XX(g) 
Article XX(g) is the main environmental exception in the 
WTO. It has traditionally been given less interpretive deference 
than Article XX(b), but it has a weaker standard to qualify than 
XX(b) does. Article XX(g) has its own unique set of tests, and 
only requires that a domestic environmental policy relates to na-
tional conservation aims.102 The first element of the test is that 
 
 96. See, e.g., EC–Asbestos supra note 87, at ¶¶ 8.172, 8.179, 8.207 (describ-
ing necessity in terms of proportional value and availability of alternative 
measures that would be consistent with the GATT). 
 97. Paris Agreement, supra note 4. 
 98. See Mehling et al., supra note 92, at 466 (asserting that the vital nature 
of climate issues make broad climate measures likely to be considered propor-
tional). 
 99. EC–Asbestos, supra note 87, at ¶ 8.172 (stating that past panels evalu-
ated necessity primarily on if other measures were available either consistent 
with or less inconsistent with the GATT). 
 100. See id., at ¶ 8.78–79 (applying GATT rules affirmed in United States – 
Shirts and Blouses in confirming the burden of proof rests on the complainant). 
 101. Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, supra note 88, at ¶¶ 162–66, 171–72 (analyz-
ing the alternatives to retreading in Brazil and concluding that none were rea-
sonably available). 
 102. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(g). 
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the resource must qualify as an exhaustible natural resource. 
For example, in the Shrimp/Turtle dispute, the Appellate Body 
confirmed that turtles qualified as an “exhaustible natural re-
source,” providing a very broad interpretation under Article 
XX(g) of that term.103 The US imposed import restrictions on 
shrimp unless a turtle excluder device was used to catch them.104 
In the past, clean air was deemed by the DSM to be an exhaust-
ible natural resource in the US–Gasoline case.105 In this case, 
the US Clean Air Act established baseline rules for gasoline sold 
on the US market in order to regulate emissions.106 The Appel-
late Body took an evolutionary approach to the concept of ex-
haustible natural resources in this case, in light of contemporary 
concerns.107 
The second element of the test is that a measure must relate 
to, or be reasonably related to, the domestic policy goal.108 The 
term “relating to” has been deemed to be a lower standard than 
“necessary,” under Article XX(b), but must be primarily aimed 
at conservation of an exhaustible natural resource.109 Again for 
the protectionist elements of a renewable energy policy, they 
must clearly relate to the overall objective of the policy. 
The third and final element of the test is that the domestic 
measure must be made in conjunction with domestic restrictions 
either on production or consumption.110 In China–Rare Earth, 
the US objected to export restrictions imposed by China on the 
 
 103. US–Shrimp, supra note 74, at Appellate Body Report, ¶ 128 (determin-
ing that the term was broader than just the inclusion of “mineral” or “non-liv-
ing” resources). 
 104. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 105. US–Gasoline, supra note 85, at ¶¶ 6.21, 6.37. 
 106. Id. at ¶ 2.1. 
 107. See US–Shrimp, supra note 74, at ⁋129 (noting that the GATT Article 
XX(g) exception “must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contempo-
rary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conserva-
tion of the environment”). 
 108. Id. at ¶ 141 (asserting that the shrimp import restrictions in question 
were permissible as they were limited in scope and furthered the policy objec-
tive, or were “reasonably related to the ends”). 
 109. See US–Gasoline, supra 85, at 14–18 (discussing “relating to” and “nec-
essary” in GATT XX(b) and XX(g)). 
 110. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, China–Measures Related to the Expor-
tation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, ¶ 5.132, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS431/AB/R (adopted Aug. 29, 2014) (“We consider that the phrase ‘made 
effective in conjunction with’ requires that, when international trade is re-
stricted, effective restrictions are also imposed on domestic production or con-
sumption.”). 
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export of rare earth materials which are critical components to 
batteries in renewable energy as well as technology and defense 
equipment.111 Here, the Appellate Body did confirm that a mem-
ber state must impose “real restrictions” on domestic production 
or consumption that reinforce and complement the restrictions 
on international trade, particularly where there is large domes-
tic consumption.112 This is often referred to as the “even-hand-
edness” approach, and may require that domestic restrictions in 
greenhouse gas emissions be implemented in conjunction with 
policies to enhance the production of renewables.113 
D. ARTICLE XX—THE CHAPEAU 
Once a domestic policy meets the requirements of the indi-
vidual provisions of Article XX, it must then satisfy the require-
ments of the “chapeau.” The DSM has a progressive interpretive 
history in the area of Articles XX(b) and (g) when interpreting 
the coverage and applicability of the scope of these sub-para-
graphs to domestic measures. The more difficult hurdle for coun-
tries to overcome is the opening paragraph of Article XX (re-
ferred to as the “chapeau”). The chapeau is more targeted not at 
the content of the measure or the aim of the domestic policy, but 
in the manner of their application. More specifically, whether 
the measures are applied in a way that is discriminatory. 
The DSM has in the past, through progressive interpretive 
approaches, provided significant domestic policy space for coun-
tries to implement trade-restrictive measures provided they 
make a material contribution to legitimate domestic policies un-
der Articles XX(b) and (g). Most problematic for protectionist 
measures would be the chapeau of Article XX. It requires that 
any measures applied by a party are not applied in a manner 
that would constitute “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination” or “a disguised restriction on international 
trade.”114 The chapeau does not prohibit discrimination, but only 
seeks to prevent abusive discrimination.115 
Despite the strict language, judicial flexibility has also been 
applied under the chapeau in the past. While the DSM 
 
 111. Id. at ¶ 1.2. 
 112. Id. at ¶ 5.132. 
 113. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 5.93, 5.101. 
 114. GATT 1994, supra note 5 (requiring that each of these standards must 
be met, meaning all are applicable). 
 115. WOLD ET AL., supra note 41, at 275. 
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determined that the US fisheries import restrictions for shrimp 
not caught using a turtle excluder device fell under Article XX(g) 
in the US–Shrimp dispute, the measure failed the test under the 
chapeau.116 The US then revised its approach to the import re-
strictions by attempting to negotiate a multilateral solution with 
the affected parties. Even though no multilateral solution was 
agreed upon by all parties, good faith negotiation efforts by the 
US were sufficient for the revised measure to survive the cha-
peau test.117 This added a largely procedural component to the 
chapeau—merely entering into good faith negotiations was suf-
ficient. The emphasis was placed on fairness and due process, 
which was achieved through the multilateral negotiations. Here, 
a less stringent approach to the language of the chapeau demon-
strates a preference by the Appellate Body for multilateral-
ism.118 
Finally under the chapeau, any discriminatory element of a 
measure will be examined against its ability to be reconciled 
with or rationally related to its policy objectives as provisionally 
justified under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX.119 While 
the climate elements of any renewable energy policy would eas-
ily pass muster under the chapeau, the economic portions of such 
a policy, such as local content requirements, would have to be 
designed and applied in such a way that it necessarily leads to 
emissions reductions,120 through increased manufacture, instal-
lation, and dissemination of renewable technology. While this 
may be easier to prove through domestic dissemination, export 
activities may be more difficult to justify under the chapeau. Any 
blatantly protectionist measure targeted at export activities may 
struggle to survive some of these tests as it becomes more diffi-
cult to tie such restrictions directly to emissions reductions, par-
ticularly domestic reductions. However, a policy that is specifi-
cally tied to domestic emissions reductions, and therefore 
 
 116. US–Shrimp, supra note 74, at ⁋187. 
 117. Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia 
⁋153–54, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter US–
Shrimp Art. 21.5]; WOLD ET AL., supra note 41, at 275. 
 118. BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 45, at 335. 
 119. Appellate Body Report, Eur. Communities–Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ⁋ 5.318, WT/DS400/AB/R (adopted 
June 18, 2014). 
 120. Mehling et al., supra note 92, at 470. 
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climate benefits, could benefit from progressive treatment under 
Article XX, including its chapeau. 
II. ENERGY, TRADE, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
The relationship between energy, trade, and climate change 
at the international level is patchy at best, and contradictory at 
worst. Climate change goals cannot be achieved without major 
energy transitions away from fossil fuels. After the Paris Agree-
ment, the overlap between trade and climate change has taken 
on a “new urgency.”121 However, the “inescapable nexus between 
trade and climate change . . . is not yet reflected in either of the 
agendas [or agreements] of the . . . WTO or the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).”122 
Without new WTO rules or a revised approach under the DSM, 
the legitimacy and efficiency of both the trade and climate re-
gimes may be undermined.123 
Meeting the long-term temperature goals in the Paris 
Agreement requires a large-scale, global transition away from 
fossil fuels and towards renewable energy.124 Parties agreed to 
reach peaking of global greenhouse gases as soon as possible, 
and achieve a balance between emissions and removals in the 
second half of the century.125 The architecture of the Paris 
Agreement focuses on national action to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, and while renewable energy is not specifically pro-
vided as a mandate under the Agreement, decarbonizing the 
world’s energy system is “by far the primary method of stabilis-
ing global temperature increases.”126 The bottom-up architec-
ture of the Paris Agreement also means that its success will rest 
primarily on domestic implementation on the basis of nationally 
determined contributions of both developed and developing 
 
 121. Michael O. Moore, Carbon Safeguard? Managing the Friction Between 
Trade Rules and Climate Policy, 51 J. World Trade 43, 45 (2017). 
 122. JAMES BACCHUS, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., TRIG-
GERING THE TRADE TRANSITION: THE G20’S ROLE IN RECONCILING RULES FOR 
TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE VI, 1 (2018). 
 123. Id. at 1–2. 
 124. INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RETHINKING ENERGY 2017: AC-
CELERATING THE GLOBAL ENERGY TRANSFORMATION 23–24 (2017). 
 125. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, art. 4 (Dec. 12, 2015) (explain-
ing that this provision is commonly understood to mean net zero emissions). 
 126. Dent, supra note 12, at 2. 
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countries—developing countries are now important partners in 
the transition to renewable energy.127 
Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agree-
ment have a high policy profile and will likely include more gov-
ernment support for renewable energy, putting them in increas-
ing conflict with WTO rules where protectionist policies are 
involved and at increased risk of scrutiny by trade partners.128 
The Paris Agreement provides discretion to the parties as to 
which specific support measures and policy instruments are 
most appropriate.129 However, the WTO does not provide such 
policy flexibility, as any measure must comply with trade disci-
plines in the WTO covered agreements, enforceable through the 
DSM. 
International trade not only allows firms to increase produc-
tion but can also aid in diffusing clean energy technology, which 
is especially important for developing countries where the “scope 
for achieving marginal gains in environmental welfare and en-
ergy efficiency are generally greatest.”130 Promoting interna-
tional trade in clean energy can make important contributions 
to climate change mitigation through business and market ex-
pansion efforts.131 A “cascade of climate-friendly, trade-impact-
ing measures” could lead to climate stabilization.132 “Climate 
measures affect trade[,]” but also “[t]rade measures affect the 
climate.”133 Emerging economies focused on export of subsidized 
renewable energy technology, have domestic policies which are 
 
 127. Provisions under the prior Kyoto Protocol imposed targeted emissions 
reductions on developed countries only. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/
Add.1 art. 2(1)(a). 
 128. Moore, supra note 121, at 47–48 (describing potential conflicts between 
climate measures and trade rules). 
 129. Gracia Marín Durán, Sheltering Government Support to “Green” Elec-
tricity: The European Union and the World Trade. Organization, 67 INT’L. & 
COMP. L. Q. 130, 134–35 (2018). But cf. BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 45, at 347–
48 (arguing that the UNFCCC regime therefore neither restricts nor condones 
the use of trade measures and instead refers parties to existing trade law). 
 130. Dent, supra note 12, at 728. 
 131. Id. at 728–29. 
 132. Juscelino F. Colares, Paths to Carbon Stabilization: How Foreign Car-
bon-Restricting Reforms Will Affect US Industry, Climate Policy and the Pro-
spects of a Binding Emission Reduction Treaty, 47 J. WORLD TRADE 281, 289 
(2013). 
 133. BACCHUS, supra note 122, at 1. 
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likely to violate trade rules, including the SCM Agreement.134 
This is why many emerging economies have been the subject to 
WTO disputes in relation to their renewable energy policies. The 
SCM Agreement focuses on trade flows between a subsidy-
providing WTO member and another WTO member.135 
A. ENERGY, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Developing countries are now major partners in the imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreement, and meeting its global tem-
perature goals. Developing countries have a large role to play in 
the climate, energy, and trade nexus. Growth in greenhouse gas 
emissions in the next few decades will come primarily from de-
veloping countries, particularly China and India.136 As law 
scholars Wu and Salzman note, “as go India and China with 
greenhouse gases, so goes the world.”137 But the international 
energy architecture is, as currently formulated, ill-suited to 
tackle the conflicts between growing energy demands and cli-
mate impacts. It is now faced with a number of difficult tasks, 
including ensuring security of supply and demand, mitigating 
the effects of climate change, “promot[ing] energy efficiency and 
renewables[,]” “dampen[ing] price volatility[,]” and “reduc[ing] 
energy poverty . . . .”138 “[E]merging economies such as India, 
China, Russia, Brazil[,] and South Africa play a vital role in in-
fluencing the contemporary energy landscape”;139 they are in-
creasingly driving global energy demand but are also carving out 
economic development space in the clean energy arena through 
green industrial policies.140 
 
 134. See, e.g., Espa & Durán, supra note 21, at 624–28 (discussing distinc-
tions important to determining “the WTO compatibility of different categories 
of [renewable energy] subsidies”). 
 135. Id. at 625. 
 136. WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ECO-
NOMIC, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (2008). 
 137. Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and Envi-
ronmental Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 
401, 449 (2014). 
 138. Sijbren de Jong & Jan Wouters, Institutional Actors in International 
Energy Law in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW 18, 19 
(Kim Talus ed., Edward Elgar 2014). 
 139. Id. at 25. 
 140. Id. at 25–32 (discussing the influence emerging economies have in dis-
cussions of green energy forums). 
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The switch away from carbon to silicon in renewable energy 
will have global winners and losers.141 Governments in develop-
ing countries are already starting to face litigation from climate-
vulnerable constituents.142 These countries are being sent mixed 
messages: to reduce emissions while being positioned as a re-
spondent in WTO disputes, largely as a result of disputes initi-
ated by developed countries disputing pro-climate (but also pro-
development) policies.143 Developing countries have pressing 
poverty eradication and energy poverty needs and are facing 
stark energy choices.144 The need to reduce global GHG emis-
sions has become so dire largely due to developed countries’ his-
toric inaction and irresponsibility: not making lifestyle “sacri-
fices necessary to move toward . . . lower per capita emissions 
rates.”145 However, many of the world’s carbon intensive (or car-
bon major) corporations are in fact state-controlled corporations 
located in the developing world.146 
 
 141. See INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 124, at 9, 20, 23, 
25–26 (describing the net-zero relationship between reliance on renewable 
energy and reliance on traditional fossil fuel energy). 
 142. See generally Joana Setzer & Lisa Benjamin, Climate Litigation in the 
Global South: Constraints and Innovations, 9 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 77, 78 
(2019) (investigating the Global South’s role in affecting environmental justice 
through climate litigation); Jacqueline Peel & Jolene Lin, Transnational Cli-
mate Litigation: The Contribution of the Global South, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 679, 
679 (2019) (addressing the impact of climate litigation in the Global South on 
transnational climate litigation); Joana Setzer & Lisa Benjamin, Climate 
Change Litigation in the Global South: Filling In Gaps 114 AM. J. INT’L L. UN-
BOUND 56, (2020);  JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE 
LITIGATION: REGULATORY PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY (James Crawford & 
John S. Bell eds., 2015) (providing an overview of climate litigation generally). 
 143. Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 449; See, e.g., Peel & Lin, supra note 
142, at 702 (writing that cases are being brought in the Global South in part to 
“seek[] accountability from Global North governments and corporations for 
their failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and decarbonize their economic 
activities” and to “support[] . . . arguments that the failure to address climate 
change has far-reaching adverse consequences for vulnerable populations that 
make a negligible contribution toward causing climate change”). 
 144. See id. at 693–94 (noting that many cases in the Global South focus 
primarily on policy concerns focusing on topics such as economic development 
and poverty alleviation, with climate change arguments taking a secondary po-
sition). 
 145. Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 444. 
 146. For example, Sinopec in China and Saudi Aramco in Saudi Arabia. See 
generally Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane 
Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854-2010, 122 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 229, 231 (2013) (noting that out of the 90 entities with the largest fossil 
fuel emissions, 31 are state-owned). See also Thomas Hale, “All Hands on Deck”: 
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Developing countries face additional challenges promoting 
renewable energy, including limited institutional, financial, and 
human resources. As a result, government intervention is often 
required.147 There has been limited progress in the last two dec-
ades on the transition to green economic growth, in part due to 
the lack of global transition policy frameworks.148 Transition 
pathways are most effective if they include long-term visions, in-
terim transition goals, pathways for different actors, and exper-
imental policy learning.149 This often involves green industrial 
policy formation in emerging economies.150 Industrial policy for-
mation experienced a resurgence after the global financial cri-
sis.151 Emerging economies that found themselves in relatively 
stable macro-economic situations after the 2008 financial crisis 
were more able to afford large programmatic approaches on 
green growth.152 These countries were also keen to adopt indus-
trial policies which could help sustain their growth and spur on 
new employment creation.153 Governments remain one of the 
main sources of incentives to protect the environment through 
domestic incentives and environmental public policy making.154 
B. GREEN INDUSTRIAL POLICY MAKING 
There has been a reinvigoration of industrial policy making 
in both developed and developing countries. This has only esca-
lated in the context of both the climate crisis and the COVID-19 
crisis, with some public health-related transitions including an 
emphasis on renewable energy and green industrial policy 
 
The Paris Agreement and Nonstate Climate Action, 16(3) GLOB. ENV’T POL. 12 
(2016); THOMAS HALE, THE ROLE OF SUB-STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN IN-
TERNATIONAL CLIMATE PROCESSES, Research Paper (Nov. 2018) (providing an 
overview of the importance of non-state actors, including corporations, to the 
new Paris climate regime). 
 147. Heede, supra note 146. 
 148. Pablo Burkolter & Leisa Perch, Greening Growth in the South: Practice, 
Policies and New Frontiers, 21 S. AFR. J. INT’L AFFS. 235, 235 (2014). 
 149. Kemp & Never, supra note 22, at 69. 
 150. See id. 
 151. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Justin Yifu Lin & Celestin Monga, Introduction to 
THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY REVOLUTION I: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT BEYOND 
IDEOLOGY 1 (Joseph E. Sitglitz & Justin Yifu Lin eds., 2013). 
 152. Burkolter & Perch, supra note 148, at 248. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, Greening Global Value Chains: Some Im-
plementation Challenges 14 (Green Growth Knowledge Platform, Working Pa-
per No. 6613, 2013). 
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making. In order to make rapid progress towards 2030 emission 
reduction goals, very large emitters such as the US, EU, China, 
India, Russia, Brazil, and Indonesia must make significant emis-
sions reductions.155 Green industrial policy making by develop-
ing countries can be an area for real progress in the transition to 
renewable energy, and litigation of energy disputes is now an 
important part of the global climate regime.156 The actions of 
these countries are important as their domestic policy decisions 
on energy can significantly affect global climate trajectories.157 
However, these policies can have mixed motives, including both 
environmental and economic protection,158 and therefore are 
vulnerable to trade rules. 
Emerging economies are concerned about their own devel-
opment trajectories and needs.159 Therefore, the transition to 
cleaner energy is often intertwined within industrial policies for 
the protection of domestic industries, and in some cases, with 
forging an economic pathway to global dominance in clean en-
ergy technologies.160 Developing countries need access to clean 
energy technology in order “to diversify their energy sources and 
to reduce their carbon emissions [and aims to do so] without hin-
dering their economic development.”161 “[O]f the [twenty-seven] 
countries . . . [which] . . . make up 90% of the global green econ-
omy, eight are from the [G]lobal South[: ]Argentina, Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa[,] and Tur-
key[].”162 A subset of these same countries have green industrial 
policies that have been disputed by the WTO: Argentina, Indo-
nesia, India, and China.163 These countries have adopted a 
 
 155. THE FREDERICK S. PARDEE CTR. & THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INITIA-
TIVE, TRADE IN THE BALANCE: RECONCILING TRADE AND CLIMATE POLICY 19 
(Nov. 2016). 
 156. Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 474. 
 157. For example, China is currently facing energy risks due to the Middle 
East crisis and United States sanctions on Iran. See Michael Lelyveld, China’s 
Energy Risks Rise with Iran Sanctions, RADIO FREE ASIA (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy_watch/risks-
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 158. Carolyn Fischer & Timothy Meyer, Baptists and Bootleggers in the Bi-
odiesel Trade: EU-Biodiesel (Indonesia), 19 WORLD TRADE REV. 297, 298 (2020). 
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 160. Id. at 473–74. 
 161. WORLD BANK, supra note 136, at 73. 
 162. Burkolter & Perch, supra note 148, at 237. 
 163. See, e.g., id. at 251(discussing challenges at the WTO to Chinese trade 
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number of strategies across domestic policy making, including 
local content requirements which seek to foster local employ-
ment and competitive domestic industries in the solar energy 
area, mercantilist export control and export price increases in 
biofuels, and subsidies and export restraints in wind power.164 
The strategies used by developing countries have to date been 
unsuccessful at the WTO.165 
Local content requirements in particular make public sup-
port for manufacturing of renewable technology subject to a cer-
tain percentage of domestically produced components or labour 
sources. There is mixed evidence on how successful local content 
requirements in particular are in terms of their environmental 
aims.166 While they certainly reduce competition by forcing reli-
ance on local suppliers,167 there is an argument that supporting 
local infant industries can allow those industries to mature and 
become competitive, ultimately lowering prices globally for re-
newable technology.168 In addition, in large emerging economies, 
economies of scale may in fact lead to lower prices for renewables 
both domestically and internationally.169 These can in turn 
 
GREEN ECONOMY – A HANDBOOK 93–94 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing the large and 
increasing number of national trade remedy cases, including one brought 
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increase competitive advantage, particularly in commodities, 
even by using imperfect monopoly competition.170 Consistently 
applied subsidies can provide certainty to infant and desirable 
industries such as renewable energy development.171 The Inter-
national Energy Agency has projected that investment in renew-
able energy will need to increase substantially in the next dec-
ade, reaching $400 billion by 2030 to meet the goal of limiting 
the peak of energy-related global greenhouse gas emissions to 
around 2020.172 It is likely, therefore, that all countries, includ-
ing developed countries, will continue to rely on renewable en-
ergy subsidies in the near future. 
Many developing countries involved in WTO disputes have 
carved out ‘green’ industrial policy space which has a dual pur-
pose of protecting and bolstering their own domestic markets in 
both natural resources and clean energy technology while 
achieving environmental goals. “[M]any . . . industrial policy 
measures [are used] to strengthen the domestic production and 
technological capacities of [domestic] producers,” thereby achiev-
ing poverty reduction and development goals.173 Emerging econ-
omies have invested resources in developing green industrial 
policies to meet both environmental and developmental goals.174 
These goals are often intricately intertwined, and developing 
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countries may be loath to remove the developmental aspects of 
their clean energy policies.175 There may not be one principal 
driver behind these policies, but economic, social and environ-
mental benefits may be equally influential.176 For example, it is 
estimated that “between 2005 and 2020, thirty million new 
green jobs . . . will be created in China.”177 India’s solar mission 
plan is explicitly concerned with energy security, energy access 
and energy poverty issues, as well as domestic industry develop-
ment, combining climate, social, and economic development con-
cerns.178 
Industrial policy mechanisms may have environmental 
aims but also trigger competitiveness concerns over rent-seeking 
with domestic industry promotion plans, as governments posi-
tion their industries for the energy transition.179 In some dis-
putes, largely in renewable energy and biofuels, developed coun-
tries are also employing protectionist methods.180 Conflicting 
trade disciplines can hamper the ability of green growth strate-
gies to contribute to poverty alleviation and more equitable and 
inclusive development within these countries.181 
III. ENERGY AT THE WTO 
The relationship between developing countries and environ-
mental and energy policies and the WTO has been fractious. De-
veloped country environmental policies which were supported by 
the DSM were seen as protectionism by developing countries, 
dressed up in environmental policies. There have also been no 
disputes at the WTO regarding fossil fuel subsidies, but a 
 
 175. See id. 
 176. Burkolter & Perch, supra note 148, at 252–53. 
 177. Id. at 239. 
 178. See India–Solar, infra section IV.A.3. 
 179. Bradly J. Condon, Disciplining Clean Energy Subsidies to Speed the 
Transition to a Low-Carbon World, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 675, 677 (2017). 
 180. See Burkolter & Perch, supra note 148, at 251. 
 181. See id., at 252. There has also been progressive economic and regulatory 
interdependence between countries, leading to diffusion of policy formation 
from the core to the periphery. See Emily Jones and Alexandra Zeitz, Regulatory 
Convergence in the Financial Periphery: How Interdependence Shapes Regula-
tors’ Decision, 63 INT’L STUDS. Q. 908 (2019). Support for renewable energy pol-
icy formation could serve as a regulatory diffusion device as well, leading to 
increased South-South collaboration on renewable energy development and dif-
fusion. 
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number of disputes on renewable energy policies.182 Most of 
these renewable energy disputes at the WTO now involve devel-
oping countries’ domestic policies. And so the WTO’s own ap-
proach to renewable energy has been inconsistent at best, and 
climate-unfriendly at worst. Article XX exceptions have either 
not been relied upon by developing countries, or dismissed as in-
applicable by the DSM in renewable energy disputes. These pro-
visions could be useful in defending domestic renewable energy 
policies in particular, but they have to be more effectively used 
by countries, tied more closely to stricter domestic policies, and 
considered more thoughtfully by the DSM. 
Energy was not specifically regulated by the WTO as part of 
a separate, distinct energy agreement due to historical reasons. 
At the time of the formation of the GATT, liberalization of the 
energy market was not a political priority.183 At that time, the 
energy market was heavily cartelized, dominated largely by fos-
sil fuel companies and state-run monopolies.184 In addition, the 
WTO has a “market access bias,” so the rules place emphasis on 
reducing import tariffs.185 However, problems in global energy 
trade now revolve primarily around export taxes or restrictions, 
not import tariffs.186 In the 1970s, the oil crisis did put export 
restrictions on the WTO negotiating table but no agreement 
could be reached on the issue.187 In particular, “resource-en-
dowed countries” were wary of agreeing to “binding rules on 
trade in natural resources” as well as environmental provisions, 
due to a fear of green protectionism by developed countries.188 
 
 182. See Part IV, infra. 
 183. See Yulia Selivanova, The WTO Agreements and Energy, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW 275, 275–76 (Kim Talus ed., Ed-
ward Elgar Pub. 2014). 
 184. See Anna Marhold, The WTO and Energy: Fuel for Debate, 2 EUR. SOC’Y 
INT’L. L. REFLECTIONS 1, 2 (Sept. 30 2013), https://esil-sedi.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Marhold-ESIL-Reflections.pdf. 
 185. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted). 
 186. See id. (discussing that while Article XI of the GATT covers both import 
and export restrictions, it covers only quantitative export limits but not export 
duties, taxes or charges); see also ALAN YANOVICH, REGULATION OF ENERGY IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1 (Yulia Selivanova ed., 2011). However, the 
Trump Administration may have reinvigorated the use of tariffs in interna-
tional trade. 
 187. Selivanova, supra note 183, at 276. 
 188. Id. at 277; Carolyn Deere Birkbeck, 20 Years of Debate on Environment, 
Trade and Sustainable Development at the WTO: A Literature Review (1995-
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The present-day energy sector is now more complex and 
stratified and “encompasses fossil and non-fossil fuels and en-
ergy including oil, gas, coal, wood, electricity, atomic en-
ergy[,] . . . solar, wind, wave and tidal [energy], . . . [and] biofu-
els.”189 The changing nature of energy sources means WTO 
covered agreements are directly applicable to the governance of 
these energy sources.190 Despite the diversification of energy 
sources, energy is still different from other industries due to its 
physical characteristics, leading to natural monopolies where 
energy resources are located (often in developing countries).191 
The bulk of international energy regulation remains at the do-
mestic level, with the role of international law in addressing en-
ergy remaining “unclear and unsettled,”192 despite the fact that 
“energy trade has transcended national borders.”193 
Energy straddles both goods and services at the WTO, as its 
physical properties are often not severable from the production 
process and channels of distribution—electricity is dependent 
upon networks and grids for distribution but renewable energy 
technology is traded more freely across borders.194 As such, 
treatment of energy within the WTO covered agreements is frag-
mented, leading some commentators to argue it would be better 
dealt with under a WTO Framework Agreement on Energy.195 
Unfortunately, there is little hope for progressive development 
of the legislative agenda at the WTO at the moment,196 and in 
the absence of a cohesive legislative approach to energy, the Dis-
pute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) has been the main mecha-
nism which has managed the relationship of energy under the 
WTO.197 
 
2015) 19–20 (U. of Oxford, Glob. Econ. Governance Programme, Working Paper 
No. 114, 2016). 
 189. Thomas Cottier et al., Energy in WTO Law and Policy 8 (NCCR Trade 
Regulation, Working Paper No. 2009/25, 2009), https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_forum_e/wtr10_7may10_e.pdf. 
 190. Id. at 1. 
 191. Id. at 2. 
 192. Id. at 7. 
 193. Kim Talus, Internationalization of Energy Law, in RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW 5 (Kim Talus ed., Edward Elgar 2014). 
 194. Cottier et al., supra note 189, at 8–9. 
 195. Id. at 2–3, 8. 
 196. See, e.g., Ben-Achour, supra note 59 (discussing current US opposition 
to WTO action). 
 197. Cottier et al., supra note 189 at 1–2. 
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A. THE DSM AND EMERGING ENERGY DISPUTES 
Energy disputes at the WTO are on the rise, but only renew-
able energy policies have been subject to dispute. Article XX ex-
ceptions failed to provide cover for these policies, leading to det-
rimental climate impacts in some cases. Since 2010, there have 
been a number of energy-related disputes adjudicated at the 
DSM. Trade flows as well as trade disputes in clean energy are 
dominated by a select group of countries, often correlated with 
the largest global emitters, traders, and markets for clean en-
ergy investments.198 The role and involvement of developing 
countries in these disputes is increasing, and as a result, new 
types of arguments, such as the principle of sustainable develop-
ment, are being employed by these countries in order to attempt 
to bolster and reorient existing GATT defenses in a more cli-
mate-friendly, but especially development-friendly direction. Re-
liance on the DSM alone to adjudicate conflicts between trade 
and climate is less than ideal. “The shoddy structure of the SCM 
Agreement, the poor judgment of WTO tribunals, the consensus 
blocking squabbling of WTO negotiations, and the mixed signals 
of energy markets have combined to create a perfect storm for 
the transition to clean energy.”199 The parties in these disputes 
have had to rely on agreements and provisions within the WTO 
covered agreements, which arguably do not cater specifically for 
energy, climate change, or sustainable development concerns. 
Ultimately both legislative amendments and jurisprudential ad-
justments will be necessary to have a more cohesive approach to 
trade, energy, and climate change at the WTO. 
Despite there being no energy agreement at the WTO, en-
ergy jurisprudence has had to be developed at the WTO by ne-
cessity, due to the sheer number of disputes being invoked be-
tween developed and developing countries, as well as the 
changing nature of energy sources.200 The first biofuels case 
 
 198. Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz & Mahesh Sugathan, Enabling the Energy 
Transition and Scale-Up of Clean Energy Technologies: Options for the Global 
Trade System- Synthesis of Policy Options, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 933, 937 (2017). 
 199. Bradly J. Condon, Disciplining Clean Energy Subsidies to Speed the 
Transition to a Low-Carbon World, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 675, 677–678 (2017). 
But see Espa and Durán, supra note 21, at 622 (arguing that there is very little 
conflict between the WTO and the SCM Agreement and climate change). 
 200. Droege et al. supra note 13, at 3. 
38 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 22:1 
 
occurred in 2012,201 and the most recent substantive decision on 
an energy dispute was published in June 2019.202 Some trends 
are identified. The original set of energy disputes saw developed 
countries submitting complaints against the domestic policies of 
other developed countries. Soon after that, the domestic policies 
of developing countries became a target, largely for developed 
countries. More recently, India has disputed renewable policies 
in eight different US states.203 In addition, developing countries 
are now challenging other developing countries in relation to 
their domestic policies, with Argentina requesting consultations 
with Peru over domestic biofuels policies.204 As a result, domestic 
policies of both developed and emerging economies are now vul-
nerable to challenges. 
Article XX defenses, in all cases in which they were invoked 
by these countries, have failed to justify green industrial poli-
cies—largely due to those policies’ protectionist elements.205 In 
addition, even where developing countries have found success in 
the biofuels disputes in law, their “successes” are being frus-
trated by developed countries through use of protectionist 
measures. These developments mean it is more and more likely 
that developing countries will employ strategic or convenient 
compliance strategies in order to further their developmental ob-
jectives unless an approach can be adopted which bridges the 
divide between the green industrial policy aims of these coun-
tries and WTO jurisprudence. 
IV. RENEWABLE ENERGY DISPUTES AT THE WTO 
Energy sources are diverse, and are dealt with in different 
WTO covered agreements depending on their typology. 206 As a 
result, different and competing forms of energy are subject to 
strongly divergent international trade rules.207 The first 
 
 201. Request for Consultation by Argentina, European Union and a Member 
State—Certain Measures Concerning the Importation of Biodiesels, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS443/1 (Aug. 17, 2012). 
 202. US–Renewable Energy Sector, supra note 2. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Request For Consultations By Argentina, Peru—Anti-Dumping And 
Countervailing Measures On Biodiesel From Argentina, WTO Doc. 
G/ADP/D129/1 (Dec. 5, 2018). 
 205. See infra sec. V.A. 
 206. COTTIER ET. AL., supra note 189, at 7. 
 207. Id. For a comprehensive analysis of the various WTO agreements and 
articles at issue in energy disputes, see generally Droege et al. supra note 13. 
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category—renewable energy disputes—largely involves the Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM Agree-
ment) as well as Article III of the GATT, and the TRIMS Agree-
ment.208 A subsidy exists under the SCM Agreement if there is 
a financial contribution by a government or public body, which 
confers a benefit which is specific to certain enterprises.209 Sub-
sidies can be applied to facilitate renewable energy investment 
and production, but can also provide subsidies for fossil fuel in-
vestments and so have important implications for action under 
the Paris Agreement.210 These disputes involve not only subsi-
dies but local content requirements which can constitute dis-
criminatory treatment, and may trigger a subsidy dispute. The 
SCM does not distinguish between subsidies for renewable en-
ergy and non-renewables.211 
The second category of biofuels cases involves the Agree-
ment on Agriculture as well as Article VI of the GATT, as bio-
diesel and ethanol are included in the HS classification system 
of agricultural crops.212 The Agreement on Agriculture classifies 
 
 208. See, e.g., Panel Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Renew-
able Energy Sector/Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed in Tariff Program, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS412/R (adopted June 5, 2014); Appellate Body Report, Can-
ada–Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector/Canada–
Measures Relating to the Feed in Tariff Program WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R 
(adopted June 5, 2014); Panel Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar 
Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/R (adopted Oct. 14, 2016); Ap-
pellate Body Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar 
Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/AB/R (adopted Oct. 14, 2016); Panel Report, 
US–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS437/R (adopted Aug. 15, 2019), Appellate Body Report, US–Countervail-
ing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R 
(adopted Aug. 15, 2019); Article 21.5 Panel Report, US–Countervailing Duty 
Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/RW (adopted 
Aug. 15, 2019). 
 209. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
14, Art. 1.2, 2.1(a),2.2 (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
 210. Droege et al. supra note 13, at 36. For an analysis of fossil fuel subsidies 
generally, see JAKOB SKOVGAARD & HARRO VAN ASSELT, THE POLITICS OF FOS-
SIL FUEL SUBSIDIES AND THEIR REFORM (CUP 2018). No fossil fuel subsidies 
have ever been the subject of a dispute at the WTO. Meyer, supra note 7, at 496. 
 211. SCM Agreement, supra note 209. 
 212. See, e.g., Panel Report, EU–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from 
Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS443/R (adopted Oct. 26, 2016); Appellate Body Re-
port, EU–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS443/AB/R (adopted Oct. 26, 2016); Panel Report, EU–Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia, WTO Doc. WT/DS480/R (adopted Feb. 
28, 2018). 
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biofuels based on whether the base crop is an industrial or agri-
cultural product.213 
A. RENEWABLE ENERGY DISPUTES 
All the most recent renewable energy disputes have been 
unsuccessful. This is largely because in the renewable energy 
sector they involved protectionist elements which fell afoul of 
WTO rules. In the biofuels cases, even where the country’s do-
mestic policies were WTO-compliant, the opposing side was able 
to avoid compliance through the WTO system. The first renewa-
ble energy dispute in 2012 involved developed countries on both 
sides as both complainants and respondents. The Canada–Re-
newable Energy/FIT dispute214 involved protectionist policies 
being both employed and contested by developed countries. This 
case also established important approaches and interpretations 
by the Panel and Appellate Body to the SCM Agreement, which 
affected later cases in this vein. However, renewable energy dis-
putes quickly evolved to include developing countries as well. In 
2014, the US–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Prod-
ucts from China215 was decided by the Appellate Body with re-
course to an Article 21.5 Panel decision published in March 
2018,216 and in 2016 the India–Certain Measures Relating to So-
lar Cells and Solar Modules was decided by the Appellate 
Body.217 In these two disputes, a developing country has been in 
 
 213. FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG. OF THE U.N., THE STATE OF FOOD AND AG-
RICULTURE 2008, 52 (2008), http://www.fao.org/3/i0100e/i0100e00.htm. 
 214. See Appellate Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Re-
newable Energy Generation Sector, ¶ 1.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R (adopted 
May 24, 2013) (outlining Japan and the European Union’s problems with the 
Panel’s findings related to Canada’s FIT Program). But see Request for Consul-
tations by China, European Union and Certain Member States-Certain 
Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 7, 2012) (showing that earlier in 2012, China submitted a 
request for consultations, but the request never proceeded to a dispute). 
 215. Appellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures 
on Certain Products from China, ¶ 1.4, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted 
Aug. 15, 2019) (describing a dispute in which China was the complainant). 
 216. Final Panel Report, United States–Countervailing Duty Measures on 
Certain Products From China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/RW (Mar. 21, 2018); see 
also Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by China, United States-Countervailing 
Duty Measures on Certain Products From China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/25 (May 
4, 2018) (requesting an appeal). 
 217. Appellate Body Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells 
and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/AB/R (adopted Oct. 14, 2016) (de-
scribing a dispute in which India was a respondent). 
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both the position of complainant as well as respondent respec-
tively. 
Figure 1 below summarizes the renewable energy disputes, 
and shows that in every case, the challenging country was suc-
cessful to some degree. In some instances, Article XX was not 
raised as a defense by the responding country. Where India did 
raise an Article XX defense against a complainant by the US, it 
was not successful. 
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 218. This appellate body dispute involved solar panels only. Trade remedy 
disputes to implement the AB outcome were not as successful for China, Final 
Panel Report, United States–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products 
from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/RW (adopted Aug. 15, 2019), and on 4 May 
2018 China requested an appeal of this decision in Recourse to Article 21.6 of 
the DSU by China, United States-Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products From China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/25 (May 4, 2018). 
 219. This dispute is also going to a trade remedy phase. Request for the Es-
tablishment of a Panel, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and So-
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Figure 1 – Renewable Energy Disputes at the WTO221 
 
1. Canada–Renewable Energy/FIT 
The first dispute involved a feed-in-tariff by the Government 
of Ontario which entered into contractual agreements with pro-
ducers of solar and wind energy. The feed-in-tariff was consti-
tuted by a fixed price per unit of production in order to encourage 
participation of new generation facilities to replace the phasing 
out of coal-fired plants, as well as to stimulate local investment 
in the production of renewable energy equipment.222 Local in-
vestment was stimulated through the requirement, in addition 
 
 220. The United States has requested an appeal of this dispute. Notification 
of an Appeal by the United States, United States – Certain Measures Relating 
to the Renewable Energy Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS510/5 (Aug. 16, 2019). Given 
the existing stasis at the Appellate Body it is unclear when an appeal will be 
heard. 
 221. A number of disputes have never proceeded beyond the request for con-
sultations stage and therefore have not been covered in detail, such as Request 
for Consultations by the United States, China–Measures Concerning Wind 
Power Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS419/1 (Jan. 6, 2011) where the US chal-
lenged grants given by the Chinese government for use of domestic parts by 
Chinese wind power manufacturers in 2011 and China terminated the program, 
and Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member 
States-Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 7, 2012), a dispute brought by China against do-
mestic content attached to FIT programs in Europe in 2012. The figures of the 
disputes summarize only the main aspects and articles involved in the dispute 
and broad outcomes. 
 222. Aaron Cosbey & Petros C. Mavroides, A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsi-
dies, Blue Industrial Policy and Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting the 
Subsidies Agreement of the WTO, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 11, 13 (2014) (describing 
the fundamental objectives of the FIT Programme); see Henok Birhanu Asme-
lash, Energy Subsidies and WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Only Renewable En-
ergy Subsidies Are Challenged, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 261, 283 (2015) (noting that 
Japan may have initiated the dispute against Canada in response to Canada 
signing an agreement to use renewable sources to generate electricity with the 
Korean company, a competitor to the Japanese firms Mitsubishi and Sharp). 
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to fixed feed-in-tariffs, of a minimum local or domestic content 
requirement in the development and construction of solar PV 
panels and wind power facilities.223 The EU and Japan sued on 
the basis that government support to both electricity generators 
(mainly local suppliers) as well as to green technology products 
(which can be more easily traded internationally) was discrimi-
natory.224 They were successful as the Panel held that the local 
content requirement was deemed to be a violation of Article III 
of the GATT.225 The Panel was keen to note the importance of 
the electricity sector as the “lifeblood of modern society,” and 
that it was not disputing the public goal of enhancing renewable 
energy generation, but was focusing instead on the trade distor-
tive elements of the program.226 The case illustrates the tension 
between the panel recognizing the policy importance of renewa-
bles but that the trade distorting elements of the policy put it in 
conflict with trade rules. 
However, while the Panel decided that there was not suffi-
cient evidence to establish whether a benefit had been provided 
under the SCM Agreement,227 the Appellate Body (AB) took a 
different approach, and defined the relevant product market for 
the SCM Agreement as separate for conventional energy versus 
renewable energy.228 This was justified by the AB on the basis 
that the renewable energy market, emphasizing supply-side fac-
tors such as operating costs, upfront costs, and intermittency, 
was constructed entirely through government regulation instead 
 
 223. Cosbey & Mavroides, supra note 222, at 13–14. 
 224. Espa & Durán, supra note 21, at 631; see Patrice Bougette & Christophe 
Charlier, Renewable Energy, Subsidies, and the WTO: Where Has the ‘Green’ 
Gone?, 51 ENERGY ECON. 407, 411 (2015) (noting that subsidies to renewable 
energy producers also have “pass through” effects which benefit power genera-
tion equipment producers). 
 225. Panel Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable En-
ergy Sector/Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed in Tariff Program, ¶ 7.167, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS412/R (adopted June 5, 2014). 
 226. Id. at ¶ 7.7–7.10 (describing the issues and factual background involved 
in the dispute). 
 227. Id. at ¶ 7.327 (stating that “a comparison between the relevant rates of 
return” and “the relevant average cost of capital” could be a useful analysis, but 
additional questions and facts must be addressed to proceed). 
 228. Appellate Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Renew-
able Energy Sector/Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed in Tariff Program, 
¶ 5.176–5.185, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R (adopted June 5, 2014). 
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of market forces.229 The AB was clear in its support for the public 
policy goals involved, stating: 
Governments intervene by reducing reliance on fossil energy resources 
and promoting the generation of electricity from renewable energy re-
sources to ensure sustainability of electricity markets in the long term. 
Fossil energy resources are exhaustible, and thus fossil energy needs 
to be replaced progressively if electricity supply is to be guaranteed in 
the long term.230 
In subsequent energy cases, no such comments regarding 
public policy interventions in the transition away from fossil 
fuels, or in fact climate change, are mentioned by the Panel or 
the AB again.231 At the time, the AB’s approach supporting the 
renewable energy policy was heavily criticized as “legal acrobat-
ics” to avoid finding that a scheme aimed at a public good is an 
inconsistent subsidy and for providing the wrong incentive to 
states to develop “industrial policy unlimited.”232 
As a result of this dispute, critics have called for the SCM 
Agreement to be renegotiated in order to provide wider policy 
space for countries to implement public goods of mitigation of 
climate change,233 and to expressly apply environmental de-
fenses under Article XX directly to the SCM Agreement.234 These 
suggested amendments involve legislative fixes and should be 
carried out in conjunction with the jurisprudential approaches 
suggested here. More progressive interpretations of Article XX 
could still allow for disputes under the SCM Agreement against 
domestic subsidies, and so both legislative and jurisprudential 
adjustments are needed. 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at ¶5.186. 
 231. But see Brazil–Taxation supra note 91, at ⁋ 7.882 (holding that the re-
duction of carbon dioxide emissions fall within GATT 1994’s environmental ex-
ceptions). 
 232. Cosbey & Mavroidis, supra note 222, at 12; see also Rajib Pal, Has the 
Appellate Body’s Decision in Canada-Renewable Energy/Canada-Feed-in Tariff 
Opened the Door for Production Subsidies?, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 125 (2014); Rolf 
H. Weber & Rika Koch, International Trade Law Challenges by Subsidies for 
Renewable Energy, 49 J. WORLD TRADE 757, 779 (2015); Luca Rubini, The Good, 
the Bad, and the Ugly: Lessons on Methodology in Legal Analysis from the Re-
cent WTO Litigation on Renewable Energy Subsidies, 48 J. WORLD TRADE 895 
(2014). But cf. ESPA & DURÁN, supra note 21, at 635 (arguing that the case did 
not have a chilling effect on the use of FIT programs globally and FIT programs 
are unlikely to be disputed by WTO members in the future). 
 233. Cosbey & Mavroides, supra note 222, at 28–34. 
 234. Id. at 34–35. 
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After the decision, the Canadian Government did reduce, 
but did not eliminate, the local content requirement.235 This re-
luctance to eliminate local content requirements reflects a broad 
consensus among countries that renewable energy support is a 
legitimate form of industrial policy making.236 While this policy 
has climate change mitigation and energy security aims, it also 
has “job creation and domestic technological progress” objec-
tives.237 The following two sets of disputes involve developing 
countries, but have attracted much less scholarly attention than 
the Canada–Renewable Energy/FIT dispute. 
2. US–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products 
from China 
In 2007, US-based firms, including the US Wind Tower 
Trade Coalition and the Steelworkers Association, petitioned the 
United States Trade Representative to initiate an anti-dumping 
and countervailing duty investigation against imports from 
China.238 From 1996–2005, foreign companies dominated 75% of 
the Chinese domestic wind turbine market.239 However, by 2009 
China had become the world’s top installer of wind, exceeding 
the US.240 As a result, China began exporting wind turbines to 
the US, which the US saw as draining investment in this tech-
nology from the US to China.241 The US Department of 
 
 235. Steve Charnovitz & Carolyn Fischer, Canada-Renewable Energy: Im-
plications for WTO Law on Green and Not-So-Green Subsidies, 14 J. WORLD 
TRADE 177, 181 (2015). 
 236. Id. at 186. 
 237. Kati Kulovesi, International Trade Disputes on Renewable Energy: 
Testing Ground for the Mutual Supportiveness of WTO Law and Climate 
Change Law, 23 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY. & INT’L ENV’T L. 342, 343 (2014). 
 238. Henok Birhanu Asmelash, Energy Subsidies and WTO Dispute Settle-
ment: Why Only Renewable Energy Subsidies Are Challenged, 18 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 261, 282–83 (2015). 
 239. Seung-Youn Oh, How China Outsmarts WTO Rulings in the Wind In-
dustry, 55 ASIAN SURV. 1116, 1120 (2015). 
 240. Kenina Lee, Note, An Inherent Conflict Between WTO Law and a Sus-
tainable Future? Evaluating the Consistency of Canadian and Chinese Renewa-
ble Energy Policies with WTO Trade Law, 24 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 57, 83 
(2011); See also Oh, supra note 239, at 1117–19 (noting that China achieved 
this global dominance through a combination of integrated industrial policies 
in both demand and supply side markets, and its motivations for doing so were 
a mix of wanting to diversify energy resources, mitigation of environmental is-
sues and to encourage industrial upgrades). 
 241. See Lee supra note 240 at 83 (discussing how in 2011 the US challenged 
grants given by the Chinese government for use of domestic parts by Chinese 
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Commerce applied seventeen countervailing duty investigations 
during 2007–2012 which included solar panels, wind towers, 
steel cylinders and steel sinks, on the basis that twelve Chinese 
State Owned Enterprises were public bodies under the SCM 
Agreement, and had applied subsidies inconsistent with the 
SCM Agreement.242 The SCM Agreement prohibits certain sub-
sidies if provided by “public bod[ies]” under Article 1.1(a)(1) (be-
ing bodies vested with, and exercising, authority to perform gov-
ernmental functions).243 The main issue in this case was 
whether the Chinese State Owned Enterprises were “public bod-
ies.”244 On most issues (except wind towers and solar panels) the 
Panel decided the US acted inconsistently with the SCM Agree-
ment in determining that ownership in and of itself was suffi-
cient to deem a state owned enterprise a public body under Arti-
cle 1.1(a)(i) of the SCM Agreement.245 At the AB level, only solar 
panels were at issue. At issue was whether a benefit was pro-
vided under Article 14 of the SCM Agreement. The AB found 
that the US explanation for rejecting in-country prices in its 
benchmark analysis of solar panels to determine whether a ben-
efit was granted to Chinese State-Owned Enterprises was incon-
sistent with its obligations under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agree-
ment.246 While successful at the AB level, China has not yet been 
able to secure compliance by the US with the AB’s ruling.247 
 
wind power manufacturers and brought a request for consultations in the 
China–Wind dispute. However, instead of proceeding to a dispute, China termi-
nated the program). 
 242. Appellate Body Report, US–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China, ¶ 1.2, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Dec. 18, 2014). 
 243. SCM Agreement, supra note 209, art. 1.1(a)(1). 
  244.  US–Countervailing Duty Measures, supra note 242, at ⁋1.7. 
 245. Id., at ⁋1.7. 
 246. Id. at ⁋4.79, (concluding that “the Panel’s analysis and reasoning is not 
sufficient to support a conclusion that the USDOC properly rejected in-country 
prices in China” in the challenged investigations). 
 247. Under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, the arbitrator determined that fifteen 
months was adequate for the US to implement the ruling, but subsequently in 
November 2016 China sought recourse to Article 21.5 proceedings, claiming the 
US had not yet implemented the ruling. The panel decision on Article 21.5 was 
published on March 21, 2018, with mixed results for China. The appeal involved 
countervailing duties imposed on a number of goods including pressure pipes, 
lead pipes, and solar panels, but not wind towers. China was not successful in 
establishing a violation of Article 1.1(a)(1) by the US on the basis of an “as ap-
plied” claim with respect to solar panels but was successful in establishing a 
violation by the US of Articles 1.1(b), 2.1(c), and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement 
and 2.1(c) on solar panel administrative reviews under the SCM Agreement. 
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3. India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar 
Modules 
The US-India dispute is one in which India did raise Article 
XX as a defense, but was not successful. India’s use of Article 
XX, however, was not ideal and in particular did not connect its 
existing public health crisis of air pollution to its national solar 
energy program. In this case, the US sued India on the basis of 
India’s national solar panel initiative. In 2010, India launched 
its Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, with the objective 
of establishing India as a global leader in solar energy, as well 
as creating conditions for the diffusion of solar energy across the 
country.248 The program aimed to generate 100,000 MW of grid-
connected solar power by 2022, and to achieve rapid and large-
scale capital investment in solar energy, encourage technical in-
novation, and phased indigenization.249 The Twelfth Five-Year 
Plan of 2011 recognized that climate change mitigation policies 
would have differential impacts on national development objec-
tives such as job creation, competitiveness, and industrial 
growth, as well as improved access to energy.250 
Domestic climate policy in India (as elsewhere) is shaped by 
national and sub-national development interests.251 The Na-
tional Solar Mission established in 2010 clearly stated national 
ambitions as both promoting ecological and sustainable growth 
while addressing the nation’s energy security challenge.252 
These dual aims were to be achieved through the creation of con-
ditions to enable a “rapid scale-up of capacity and technical in-
novation to drive down costs” of solar energy.253 The policy took 
 
See Panel Report, United States–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China: Recourse to Article 21.5, ¶¶ 7.142, 7.224, 7.293, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS437/RW (adopted Mar. 21, 2018). 
 248. See Panel Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and 
Solar Modules ¶ 7.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/R (adopted Feb. 24, 2016) (citing 
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Resolution, No.5/14/2008-P&C (Issued 
Jan. 11, 2010), http://164.100.94.214/resolution) (explaining the goals of India’s 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Aaron Alteridge et al., Climate Policy in India: What Shapes Interna-
tional, National and State Policy?, 41 AMBIO 68, 72 (2012) (acknowledging the 
various impacts on various aspects of India’s development objectives). 
 251. Id. at 74. 
 252. Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, 1 https://www.seci.co.in/up-
load/static/files/mission_document_JNNSM(1).pdf (establishing India’s na-
tional ambitions as motivation for its solar power initiative). 
 253. Id. at 1–2. 
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a phased approach, with phase two between 2013–2017 focused 
on “aggressively ramp[ing] up” capacity “to create conditions for 
scaled up and competitive solar energy penetration [across] the 
country.”254 The policy specifically targeted electrification pro-
grams in remote villages as well as supporting small and me-
dium sized enterprises in manufacturing parts.255 In addition, 
India’s enormous growth in the past few decades is straining its 
existing energy resources, with 80% of the oil in the country 
sourced from imports.256 Therefore, energy security was also a 
major aim of the domestic program.257 Curiously, improvement 
in air pollution and health did not form part of the national stra-
tegic plan. 
In order to achieve the aims of the program, the government 
would enter into long-term power purchase agreements with so-
lar power developers, providing a guaranteed rate for twenty-
five years from the government.258 During Phase I of the pro-
gram, it was mandatory for all generators to use crystalline sili-
con solar modules manufactured in India, constituting a local 
content requirement.259 The US brought a dispute against India 
for violation of Article III:4 of the GATT for the local content re-
quirement and Article 2.1 of TRIMS (which similarly requires 
national treatment in the implementation of a trade related in-
vestment measure).260 The US did not invoke the SCM Agree-
ment, perhaps due to the Canada–Renewable Energy/FIT deci-
sion. Following the Canada–Renewable Energy/FIT decision, 
the Panel found the local content requirement violated both Ar-
ticle III:4 of the GATT as well as Article 2.1 of TRIMS.261 
Unlike Canada, however, India ran several defenses under 
Article III:8(a) for government policies, and also under Articles 
XX(j) and (d). Article XX(j) protects measures essential to the 
acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short 
 
 254. Id. at 3. 
 255. Id. at 5. 
 256. MINISTRY OF NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR 
NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY SECTOR FOR PERIOD 2011-2017 7 (Issued Febru-
ary 2011), https://www.ctc-n.org/sites/www.ctc-n.org/files/resources/strate-
gic_plan_mnre_2011_17.pdf. 
 257. Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, supra note 252, at 1-2. 
 258. Id. at 8. 
 259. Panel Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and So-
lar Modules, ¶ 7.8, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/R (adopted Feb. 24, 2016). 
 260. Id. at ⁋1.1. 
 261. Id. at ¶8.2. 
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supply.262 Article XX(d) protects measures necessary to secure 
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement.263 Curiously, India did 
not attempt to apply the defenses of Articles XX(b) for health 
grounds on the basis of reduced air pollution in the transition to 
renewable energy, or XX(g) for the protection of the atmosphere 
as an exhaustible natural resource due to climate change,264 and 
therefore an opportunity was missed for renewable energy de-
ployment in the context of climate change to be examined by the 
Panel and AB. Instead, India couched defenses around energy 
security and energy access needs and regulatory climate require-
ments; that under XX(j) domestically manufactured solar cells 
and modules could help to meet increasing domestic energy de-
mand and supplement shortage of supplies of foreign solar cells, 
and that under XX(d) the solar program was required for India 
to comply with a number of both international treaties (includ-
ing the UNFCCC) and domestic instruments to mitigate climate 
change and transition to renewable energy.265 India may have 
focused on Article XX(j) and not on XX(b) due to the emphasis in 
its national policy on energy security, and its lack of emphasis 
in domestic policy on the impacts of climate change on health. 
India was not successful on either count. In relation to XX(j), 
both the Panel and AB held that there was no objective assess-
ment of an existing deficiency of renewable energy in India, and 
while there was some risk of disruption of supply in affordable 
foreign solar cells, India had not identified actual disruptions in 
supply, and therefore could not employ the XX(j) defense.266 In 
relation to Article XX(d), India cited the preambular reference to 
sustainable development in the WTO Agreement, the UNFCCC, 
the Rio Declaration, and the UNGA Resolution 2012 adopting 
 
 262. GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(j). 
 263. Id. art. XX(d). 
 264. BODANSKY ET AL. supra note 45 (arguing that based on the US–Gaso-
line and the Shrimp/Turtle disputes, the global climate would constitute an 
exhaustible natural resource and therefore bring climate change mitigation pol-
icies within the ambit of Article XX(g)). 
 265. India–Solar, supra note 259, at ¶7.189–191 (summarizing India’s argu-
ments for why the domestic content requirements (DCRs) imposed under India’s 
Jawaharial Nehru National Solar Mission are essential and fall within the Ar-
ticle XX(d) and XX(j) exceptions of the GATT 1994). 
 266. See id. at ¶¶ 7.225–7.262 (explaining why India’s arguments are insuf-
ficient to qualify for the Article XX(j) exception of the GATT 1994). 
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the Rio +20 Declaration. For example, the preamble to the WTO 
Agreement states WTO members recognize that 
“their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be 
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full em-
ployment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and 
effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods 
and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources 
in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking 
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development.”267  
The Panel held that these instruments did not have direct 
effect in India and therefore did not fall under the remit of Arti-
cle XX(d), and India’s laws on renewable energy were more akin 
to policy documents than regulations.268 
On appeal, the AB did note, in relation to Article XX(j), that 
developing countries may be more vulnerable to disruptions in 
supply, and that an analysis of whether a product is in short 
supply must be done on a case by case basis, taking into account 
holistic factors.269 However, while the AB could agree that an 
increase in domestic capacity may lead to an increase in total 
quantity of available supply of renewable energy, it did not agree 
that a decrease in domestic capacity would necessarily produce 
a foreign shortfall.270 In relation to Article XX(d), the AB held 
that the instruments pointed out by India did not contain the 
requisite degree of normativity, specificity and enforceability.271 
The domestic national plans and policies on energy were too 
“hortatory, aspirational, declaratory,” and “descriptive” to qual-
ify for protection under Article XX(d).272 
 
 267. WTO Agreement, supra note 35. 
 268. See id. at ¶¶ 7.298–7.339 (explaining why India’s arguments are insuf-
ficient to qualify for the Article XX(d) exception of the GATT 1994). 
 269. See Appellate Body Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar 
Cells and Solar Modules, ¶ 5.74, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/AB/R (adopted Oct. 14, 
2016) (explaining how the Appellate Body both agrees and disagrees with ele-
ments of India’s Article XX(j) argument). 
 270. Id. 
 271. See id. at ¶¶ 5.104–5.137 (discussing the legal standard under Article 
XX(j) of the GATT 1994 and whether the Panel erred in its assessment of the 
domestic instruments identified by India). 
 272. See id. at ¶ 5.133 (stating that the Appellate Body fails to see how the 
domestic instruments India has identified could be interpreted as a “rule” 
within the context of Article XX(d)). 
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4. United States–Certain Measures Relating to Renewable 
Energy 
In September 2018, India sued the US in relation to renew-
able energy programs in a number of US states. India claimed 
these programs included a number of discriminatory elements, 
including domestic content and labor requirements as well as 
other incentives provided by California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, and Minnesota.273 These 
various regulations offered incentives for renewable energy 
equipment or electricity provided from equipment or compo-
nents made in the relevant state or employing a certain percent-
age of residents of that state. For example, the California Self-
Generation Incentive Program provided incentives for installa-
tion of new qualifying technologies which would meet the electric 
energy needs of a new facility.274 An added incentive payment of 
20% would be provided to any retail electric or gas distribution 
customer for installation of eligible distributed resources from a 
California supplier or manufacturer.275 The Delaware Renewa-
ble Energy Portfolio Standards Act required that electricity sup-
pliers and municipal electric companies sell a certain percentage 
of their electricity using eligible energy resources including solar 
energy.276 This was tracked using renewable and solar energy 
credits tradeable in an electronic market system.277 An addi-
tional 10% credit was provided to retail electricity suppliers for 
meeting the renewable energy portfolio standards for solar or 
wind energy from installations sited in Delaware, provided a 
minimum of 50% of the renewable equipment used was manu-
factured in Delaware or from a facility constructed or staffed 
with a minimum of 75% of in-state workforce.278 The disputed 
policies of Montana concerned biodiesel and ethanol, which en-
joyed tax incentives if the fuel or feedstock for those fuels were 
produced in the state concerned.279 India claimed that several 
regulations in these regulations treated imported like products 
less favorably than domestic products and therefore violated 
 
 273. US–Renewable Energy, supra note 2. 
 274. Id. at ¶ 2.14. 
 275. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 379.6(j) (West 2019). 
 276. US–Renewable Energy, supra note 2, at ¶2.51. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id at ¶ 2.52. 
 279. Id. at ¶2.20. 
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Article III:4 of GATT as well as several articles of the TRIMS 
and SCM Agreement. 
The Panel found that all of these measures violated Article 
III:4 by impacting the conditions of competition between domes-
tic and imported products, even though some of these incentives 
payments had never been used.280 It did not matter to the Panel 
that no trade effects or proof that the measures had affected 
sourcing decisions of private firms had been provided.281 The 
United States did not attempt to rely on any Article XX defenses 
in this dispute, and has appealed the decision.282 At the moment, 
given the backlog of cases pending appeal, the dispute is unlikely 
to be resolved for some time.283 
B. BIOFUELS DISPUTES 
The second category of cases involves the export of biofuels. 
Biofuels are a potential alternative to fossil fuels, particularly in 
the transportation sector.284 They constitute both biodiesel for 
use primarily in diesel engines and made from ethanol or alcohol 
from fermented plant starches, and bioethanol for use in petrol 
engines and made from vegetable oil or animal fats.285 The envi-
ronmental sustainability of biofuels has been debated, particu-
larly first generation biofuels, as their production can lead to 
 
 280. Id. at ¶8.4. 
 281. Id. at ¶ 7.245 (stating that trade effects or proof of impact on sourcing 
decisions of private firms may be involved in an assessment under Article III:4 
of the GATT 1994, but they are not required). 
 282. Notification of an Appeal by the United States, United States–Certain 
Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS510/5 
(Aug. 16, 2019). 
 283. See Lehne, supra note 14, at 133 (describing how it would be almost 
impossible for the Appellate Body to, among other things, submit its reports 
within the 90-day deadline due to the backlog of cases created by the US block-
age of Appellate Body member appointments). 
 284. Harri Kalimo, Filip Sedefor & Max S. Janson, Market Definition as 
Value Reconciliation: The Case of Renewable Energy Promotion Under the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 17 INT’L ENV’T AGREE-
MENTS 427, 430 (2017). 
 285. Id. at 434; Elisa Ruozzi, China and Biofuels: Legal and Policy Issues in 
the Framework of the WTO System, 6 CHINA-EU L. J. 33, 33–34 (2016) (discuss-
ing that biofuels are liquid fuels based on biomass which can vary in source and 
chemical structure. First generation biofuels are largely constituted by sugar-
cane ethanol, starch-based or corn-based ethanol, biodiesel from pure plant oil 
and some niche biofuels such as biogas. Second generation biofuels are made 
from cellulose, hemicellulose or lignin, for example cellulose ethanol or algae-
based biofuels (the latter is also known as a third generation biofuel)). 
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direct and indirect land-use change, remove arable land for food 
production, and provide low wages and insecure employment.286 
Developing countries have been both active and successful 
in law in biofuels disputes. Argentina is a major exporter of bio-
fuels based on raw materials of soybeans, and Indonesia based 
on palm oil. Due to labor costs, geography and climate, develop-
ing countries have natural cost advantages in the production of 
biofuels.287 Major exporters of biofuels include Brazil, Argentina, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, China, Saudi Arabia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, 
India, Korea, and Nigeria.288 Developed countries therefore need 
a high rate of subsidization in order to protect their industries 
from lower-cost imports from tropical regions.289 Due to the na-
ture of biofuels as crops, they fall under the Agreement on Agri-
culture (AoA), but fall under two different categories in the HS 
classification system (bioethanol under HS Chapter 22 and bio-
diesel under HS Chapter 38) based on their chemical composi-
tion.290 Biodiesel is also classed as an industrial good, subject to 
the SCM Agreement.291 
Developing countries have employed differential export tar-
iffs in order to protect their domestic biofuel industries. They 
have taxed the export of raw materials used in the development 
of biofuels at a higher rate than the export of processed biofu-
els.292 This allows the value of the raw materials to be reduced 
on the domestic market, making them cheaper for purchase by 
domestic producers, and therefore making domestically 
 
 286. Claudia Franziska Bruhwiler & Heinz Hauser, Biofuels and WTO Dis-
ciplines, 63 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 7, 7–8 (2008); Gretchen Gordon, The Global 
Free Market in Biofuels, 51 DEV. 481, 481–82 (2008). 
 287. Bruhwiler & Hauser, supra note 286, at 10. 
 288. Id. at 9; Doaa Abden Motael, The Biofuels Landscape: Is There a Role 
for the WTO? 42 J. WORLD TRADE 61, 69 (2008). 
 289. Bruhwiler & Hauser, supra note 286, at 16; see also Press Conference, 
United Nations, Press Conference Launching International Biofuels Forum 
(Mar. 2, 2007), http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/070302_Biofuels.doc.htm 
(establishing the International Biofuels Forum under the auspices of the UN, 
as a joint project with Brazil, the US, EU, China, India, and South Africa as a 
mechanism to co-ordinate and share information between both well established 
and less well established players on the international biofuels scene). 
 290. Biofuels can be either biodiesel from foodstocks such as corn, or 
biodiesel from lipids such as animal fats. Bruhwiler & Hauser, supra note 286, 
at 19. 
 291. Sarah L. Stattman & Aarti Gupta, Negotiating Authority in Global 
Biofuel Governance: Brazil and the EU in the WTO, 15 GLOB. ENV’T. POL. 41, 
51 (2015). 
 292. Ruozzi, supra note 285, at 48. 
2020] RENEWABLE ENERGY AND TRADE 55 
 
processed biofuels more competitive on the international mar-
kets,293 allowing domestic producers to scale the value chain and 
bolster domestic biofuel industries. In response to these strate-
gies, the EU added anti-dumping duties under the Anti-Dump-
ing Agreement (ADA) on to imports of biofuels from developing 
countries, leading to two sets of disputes brought by Argentina 
and Indonesia, both acting as complainants. 
Figure 2 illustrates that both Argentina and Indonesia were 
successful in defending their domestic policies on biofuels by im-
posing export restraints. Despite their success, each country has 
struggled to have the decision implemented, and developed 
countries continue to impose some level of protectionist policy on 
import of biofuels from abroad. 
  
 
 293. Id. 
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Figure 2 – Biofuels Disputes at the WTO294 
 
 294. There have been a number of other disputes regarding EU sustainabil-
ity criteria imposed on imports of biofuels, which Brazil addressed through di-
plomacy, and also on domestic content requirements in Spain. Argentina re-
quested consultations with the EU on both of these issues, but they never 
proceeded to a dispute and so have not been included here. See Request for Con-
sultations by the European Union and a Member State—Certain Measures Con-
cerning the Importation of Biodiesels, WTO Doc. WT/DS443/1 (Aug. 23, 2012); 
Request for Consultations by the European Union and Certain Member 
States—Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and 
Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, WTO Doc. WT/DS459/1 23 (May 
15, 2013). 
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1. EU–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina 
Argentina brought a dispute against the EU regarding anti-
dumping duties imposed on biodiesel from Argentina.295 Anti-
dumping duties are import duties imposed by a country that be-
lieves another country has exported their goods to them at 
cheaper than market rates. This behavior is regulated by the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement under the WTO (ADA).296 The Agree-
ment regulates how a domestic investigating authority, which 
recommended the level of anti-dumping duties to impose, can 
calculate the level of those import duties. Article 2.2 of the ADA 
Agreement requires an investigating authority use either the 
cost of production in the country of origin (plus a reasonable 
amount for administration, selling, etc.) or the costs normally 
calculated based on records kept by the exporter or producer un-
der investigation.297 The EU argued that it added import duties 
based on the international reference price for what domestic Ar-
gentinian biofuels producers should have paid for domestic raw 
material inputs by adding to the price of soybeans the direct ex-
port taxes imposed by Argentina in order to construct the normal 
value for dumping calculations.298 Argentina argued that this 
approach violated Article 2.2.1.1 and 2.5 of the ADA Agreement 
which required the EU to determine the normal value based on 
the domestic producer’s records in the country of origin, and 
whether they reasonably reflect the costs of production actually 
incurred by the producers.299 The Panel and AB agreed with Ar-
gentina, deciding that as a general principle the actual data of 
producers in the country of origin was to be preferred in con-
structing the normal value.300 In addition, the EU had failed to 
calculate costs correctly on the basis of the records kept by do-
mestic producers.301 
 
 295. Request for Consultations by Argentina, Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Biodiesel from Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS473/1 (Dec. 19, 2013). 
 296. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter ADA Agreement]. 
 297. Id. art. 2.2. 
 298. Panel Report, European Union–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel 
from Argentina, ¶ 7.180–82, WTO Doc. WT/DS473/R (Mar. 29, 2016). 
 299. Id. at ¶ 7.81. 
 300. Id. at ¶ 7.231. 
 301. See id. ¶¶ 7.236-7.249. 
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2. EU–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia 
The subsequent case, decided in 2018, involved a dispute 
brought by Indonesia against similar practices by the EU on bi-
odiesel implemented in 2013 by the EU as a result of complaints 
by the European Biodiesel Board.302 Similar to Argentina, Indo-
nesia claimed the EU had not calculated the costs of production 
of biodiesel based on records of domestic producers in construct-
ing the normal value for Indonesian producers, claiming the set 
of circumstances facing Indonesia was “essentially identical” to 
those successfully raised by Argentina.303 The EU claimed that 
differential export tariffs depressed the price of soybeans and 
soybean oil from Argentina, as well as crude palm oil (CPO) from 
Indonesia, distorting the cost of biodiesel producers.304 Indonesia 
added an export tax of 40% on the raw material for CPO, palm 
fruit.305 The EU disregarded the actual costs of raw materials as 
recorded by producers in Indonesia, and instead used the refer-
ence price for CPO as published by Indonesian authorities which 
averaged published international prices from three sources 
(costs, insurance, and freight from Rotterdam, Malaysia, and In-
donesia).306 The Panel held this approach violated Article 2.2.1.1 
of the ADA which required that costs normally be calculated on 
the basis of records kept by exporters or producers under inves-
tigation, provided their records are in accordance with GAAP.307 
It should be noted that the palm oil industry in Indonesia in par-
ticular has been highly criticized for its contributions to defor-
estation, and therefore although a renewable energy, its climate 
benefits are highly questionable.308 
Despite WTO “wins” in disputes, unilateral action by the 
United States and Peru could render the Argentinian biofuels 
industry nonviable.309 Given these developments, protectionist 
 
 302. Panel Report, European Union Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel 
from Indonesia, WTO Doc. WT/DS480/R (Feb. 28, 2018). 
 303. Id. at ¶ 7.12. 
 304. Id. at ¶ 7.13. 
 305. See id. ¶ 7.14 (“The export for palm fruit was set at a rate of 40%.”). 
 306. Id. ¶ 7.15. 
 307. Id. at ¶ 7.34. 
 308. Abrahm Lustgarten, Palm Oil Was Supposed to Help Save the Planet. 
Instead It Unleashed a Catastrophe, NEW YORK TIMES MAG., (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/magazine/palm-oil-borneo-climate-catas-
trophe.html; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 17, 
at 269. 
 309. Meyer, supra note 7, at 547–48. 
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disputes in the biofuels arena may continue for some time, and 
differential export tariffs may in reality not provide a benefit to 
developing countries given the domestic actions of the EU and 
US, until fresh disputes have made their way through the 
DSM.310 This means that biofuel exporting countries may not 
benefit from a decline in the DSM, and are more economically 
vulnerable to unilateral trade measures. Where biofuels do not 
have beneficial climate impacts, this strategic compliance, this 
time largely by developed countries, may not be all bad for the 
climate. 
V. LESSONS LEARNED 
The nature of environmental disputes at the WTO and the 
role of developing countries is shifting. While the older disputes 
which led to progressive interpretation of Article XX provisions 
were primarily natural resource and environmental disputes, 
energy disputes are now replacing these older disputes. Wu and 
Salzman note that the “classic” environmental disputes of the 
1990s, in which developing countries brought disputes against 
“protectionist” environmental measures implemented by devel-
oped countries, have now given way to disputes brought primar-
ily by developed countries against new “green” industrial policy 
 
 310. There are two other categories of raw materials cases which are more 
indirectly related to energy and so are not covered in this paper. These are the 
disputes between mainly the US and China on raw materials and rare earth 
minerals. These cases turned on the interpretation of the provisions of the Ac-
cession Protocol of China, the main respondent in these disputes, as well as 
providing arguendo interpretations of Article XX of the GATT regarding export 
restriction. They involve raw materials and minerals such as gallium, lithium, 
nickel, antimony, indium lanthanum, magnesium, and tin which are used in 
rechargeable batteries. See Panel Report, China–Measures Related to the Ex-
portation of Various Raw Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/R (adopted July 5, 
2011); Appellate Body Report, China–Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Various Raw Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/AB/1 (adopted Jan. 30, 2012); 
Panel Report, China–Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tung-
sten and Molybdenum, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/R (adopted May 20, 2015); Appel-
late Body Report, China–Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and Molybdenum, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/AB/R (adopted May 20, 
2015). The general outcome of these disputes was that China was not able to 
rely on Article XX due to a restrictive interpretation of its Accession Protocol. 
However, even if China were allowed to rely on Article XX in this dispute, those 
efforts would have been unsuccessful given the arguendo interpretations of Ar-
ticle XX. 
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measures implemented by developing countries.311 Developing 
countries were successful in all of their dispute efforts in these 
older “classic” environmental disputes, but have experienced 
mixed and largely negative outcomes in the newer energy dis-
putes. Dubbed the “next generation” of trade and environmental 
conflicts, Wu and Salzman anticipate these new types of dis-
putes, based on green industrial policy, will dominate the trade 
and environment discourse for decades to come,312 and so ulti-
mately some synergy between the trade and climate change re-
gime is needed. 
The interface between trade and climate change is at the 
heart of legal developments in energy law,313 and this relation-
ship, along with these particular disputes, are understudied. 
Left unchecked, governance deficiencies in the trade-climate 
nexus could “constrain the potential for trade to expand clean 
energy technologies worldwide,”314 which would lead to negative 
consequences for the climate. Poor outcomes in these energy dis-
putes and the current approach of the DSM to Article XX means 
the WTO may not be an appropriate forum to adjudicate energy 
disputes in the context of climate change. A move away from 
multilateralism in the climate context may not be a bad thing in 
the short term. In the longer term, a better synergy between the 
WTO and the goals of the Paris Agreement will be needed in or-
der to avoid catastrophic climate change and ensure a more co-
hesive global strategy to increase the diffusion of renewable en-
ergy. 
The regime complex of climate change means that several 
narrow regimes exist which concern climate change, without a 
clear hierarchy among the regimes.315 While regime complexes 
 
 311. See Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 404 (listing the “classic” trio en-
vironmental disputes as Tuna/Dolphin, Shrimp/Tuna, and US–Gasoline, 
deeming cases such as EC–Biotech and Brazil–Tyres to be more concerned with 
health than environmental issues). 
 312. Id.; see also YANOVICH, supra note 186, at 1. 
 313. See Burkolter & Perch, supra note 148, at 238 (discussing ways to ad-
dress the “perennial challenge” of “[a]chieving a better balance of environmen-
tal issues within the economic agenda and the ecological and economic govern-
ance of natural resources . . .”). 
 314. Dent, supra note 12, at 729. 
 315. Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate 
Change, 9 PERSP. ON POLS., 7, 8 (2011) (“Regime Complexes are marked by con-
nections between the specific and narrow regimes but the absence of an overall 
architecture or hierarchy that structures the whole set.”). 
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can have dysfunctional tendencies, there may exist “flexibility 
across issues, and adaptability over time.”316 Adopting more cli-
mate-friendly interpretations of Article XX is not outside the 
bounds of the history of the DSM. Facing significant criticism in 
the 1990s, the DSM developed more flexible interpretations of 
Article XX(b) and XX(g) that could better cater for domestic pol-
icy priorities such as health and the environment.317 These are 
now considered valuable policy norms in the WTO, and climate 
change and related clean energy policies should benefit from 
similar treatment. 
Conversely, not adopting a more generous approach to pri-
orities such as climate change and cleaner energy, would put the 
WTO in conflict with the Paris Agreement and later agreements’ 
expectations that countries progressively ratchet up their ambi-
tion over time in nationally determined contributions. In the ab-
sence of WTO legislative responses on energy, the inability of the 
DSM to recognize and prioritize climate change and sustainable 
developmental aims is likely to further erode confidence in the 
WTO system, particularly on the part of developing countries 
and especially emerging economies, and leave all parties vulner-
able to evasive and non-compliant behavior, as well as trade 
remedies. This may have negative consequences both for climate 
change mitigation as well as for the development trajectories of 
developing countries and multilateralism in the longer term. 
The flexibility and adaptability of the DSM has been identi-
fied as one way for the WTO to navigate through its current im-
passe of the Doha Round,318 and could also be a method to forge 
a more compatible relationship between trade and climate 
change. Relying on the “generative quality”319 of the DSM, this 
paper suggests two complementary approaches which could be 
adopted to smooth the conflict between green industrial policy 
making in the energy area and existing WTO jurisprudence. 
A number of contextual interpretations of WTO law and les-
sons can be gleaned from these disputes. Most importantly, en-
ergy disputes are escalating at the WTO, despite its declining 
 
 316. Id. at 15. 
 317. See discussion supra Part I(A)–(C). 
 318. See Klasen, supra note 47 at 68–69, 73–75 (discussing the Doha Round’s 
“immense difficulties” as a key example of gridlock in international trade, and 
later identifying the DSM as “one of the pathways through gridlock . . . [as an] 
autonomous international institution . . . able to adapt to shifting interests”). 
 319. Id. at 74. 
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prominence as a multilateral institution and attempts to para-
lyze the DSM by the United States. While there may be a “pause” 
in disputes in the short term, if the WTO and DSM are reinvig-
orated, energy disputes are likely to continue. There is an in-
creasing diversity of complainants and respondents in these dis-
putes, and now both developed and developing countries’ policies 
are in play, with emerging economies now suing developed and 
developing countries over their domestic policy making. 
There is a trend of unsuccessful employment of Article XX 
by developing countries, illustrating that Article XX tends to 
protect conservation-only policies.320 Therefore, green industrial 
policy which is tinged with both environmental and infant-in-
dustry or other domestic protection elements is likely to be un-
successful, particularly under Article XX, unless empirical evi-
dence linking protectionist measures to emissions reductions is 
provided.321 Strategic compliance by developing countries as a 
result may mean that they will be more able to implement do-
mestic protectionist policies around energy. Provided these poli-
cies are well designed and implemented and focus on increased 
manufacture and diffusion of renewable energy, this may not be 
all bad for the climate in the short term. 
In the short term, a strategic compliance approach may not 
be entirely negative if it provides policy space for countries to 
implement urgent and progressive climate action by fostering 
the manufacture and diffusion of renewable energy technology. 
However, in the longer term, a more synergistic relationship be-
tween the WTO and the Paris Agreement should be found. In 
particular for developing countries which seek to export renew-
able energy, multilateral disputes at the DSM can result in sus-
pensions of concessions through the trade remedy function 
which can negatively affect other areas of their economy. Unilat-
eral remedies can also be harmful where an importing country 
identifies a material injury as a result of another country’s do-
mestic measures in accordance with the Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties Agreement.322 In fact, the bulk of trade 
 
 320. See, e.g., supra Part V.A.3 (discussing the India–Solar dispute). 
 321. Cf. Brazil–Retreaded Tyres, supra note 88, at ¶ 145 (emphasizing the 
importance of “a genuine relationship of ends and means between the objective 
pursued and the measure at issue”). 
 322. Wu and Salzman highlight the concern regarding unilateral measures 
by countries. Supra note 137. Espa and Durán criticize the ability of a unilateral 
determination of material injury and the ability of governments to balance 
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remedies against renewable energy policies are occurring at the 
unilateral level.323 Unilateral measures can also increase the 
cost of renewables internationally, and can be particularly prob-
lematic for emerging economies that export renewable technol-
ogy.324 Despite these negative effects, unilateral actions do not 
result in direct trade remedies against a subsidizing country, 
and still allow for increased domestic production and diffusion, 
as well as export to other countries which have not implemented 
unilateral measures. 
The picture looks slightly different in the biofuels disputes 
where developing countries were successful in the DSM, but 
their legal successes are being undermined by convenient com-
pliance or evasion by developed countries.325 Developing coun-
tries are being denied reliance on comparative advantages in 
natural resources, and also are not able to defend their develop-
ment trajectories within the WTO system. However, as the cli-
mate benefits of biofuels can be questionable, particularly those 
based on palm oil,326 unilateral measures adopted may not be as 
negative for the climate as the measures adopted in relation to 
solar and wind technology. These unilateral biofuels measures 
may stymie the growth of these industries and therefore conse-
quentially slow deforestation rates. Overall, however, strategic 
or convenient compliance strategies by developing countries are 
likely to continue as countries carve out green industrial policy 
space by maneuvering around WTO rules and dispute outcomes 
where that is financially feasible. 
 
negative trade-distortive policies against positive climate mitigation effects par-
ticularly when their own domestic industries may be suffering as a result, alt-
hough they point to the EU Council dispute as to whether countervailing duties 
on the import of renewable technology should be terminated due to the Union 
interest in maintaining affordable international prices for renewables and the 
EU’s own climate policies. Espa & Durán, supra note 21, at 642; Council and 
EP Regulation 2016/1037, OJ 2016 L176/55, Article 31 (June 8, 2016). 
 323. Espa & Durán, supra note 21, at 631. 
 324. For example, decreased subsidy support in China for renewables and 
the transition to market-based approaches has been linked to the high cost of 
public subsidies but also economic uncertainty due to trade conflicts with the 
United States. Michael Standaert, Why China’s Renewable Energy Transition 
is Losing Momentum, YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (Sept. 26, 2019), 
https://e360.yale.edu/features/why-chinas-renewable-energy-transition-is-los-
ing-momentum. 
 325. See supra, Part V.B.2. 
 326. See Lustgarten, supra note 308. 
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Successful climate change mitigation strategies should ar-
guably support developing countries’ economic and social devel-
opment needs,327 and so trade policy should work in tandem with 
climate and development aims. Unfortunately, the jurispru-
dence assessed to date does not lead to these outcomes for the 
developing countries involved. Progressive interpretive ap-
proaches adopted by the DSM, and highlighted in section I 
above, could be extended to domestic renewable energy policies 
which advance nationally determined contributions under the 
Paris Agreement and also protect public health and natural re-
sources under both Articles XX(b) and XX(g). 
A.  STRATEGIC COMPLIANCE 
The analysis shows that developing countries are already 
using strategic compliance approaches to protect domestic devel-
opment agendas and create more policy pace for themselves in a 
trade-restrictive world. China was successful in defeating uni-
laterally imposed protectionist policies adopted by the US in re-
lation to solar cells and wind turbines in principle, but substan-
tive trade remedies to remove the trade-inconsistent behavior 
have yet to be realized. Under WTO law, the case provided Chi-
nese state-owned enterprises the flexibility to continue to pro-
vide subsidies to the industry provided the enterprises are struc-
tured so that they do not fall under the definition of a “public 
body” under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. However, 
China has not been successful in fact (as opposed to in law), as 
the US has not brought its measures into conformance. In a cor-
ollary action, the US did bring a dispute against China for sub-
sidies in the wind industry (China–Wind),328 and China decided 
to remove the trade-distorting practice instead of pursuing the 
dispute to a Panel decision.329 In relation to this consultation on 
the China–Wind issue, even when China withdrew the offending 
subsidies pursuant to the request for consultations from the US, 
China’s pattern of strategic or “convenient compliance” allowed 
it enough time to achieve economic dominance in the wind 
 
 327. WORLD BANK, supra note 136, at 6–7. 
 328. Consultation Requested, China–Measures Concerning Wind Power 
Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS419/1 (Dec. 22, 2010). 
 329. Press Release, US Trade Representative, China Ends Wind Power 
Equipment Subsidies Challenged by the United States in WTO Dispute, June 7, 
2011, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2011/
june/china-ends-wind-power-equipment-subsidies-challenged. 
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industry, fulfilling its development goals through non-WTO com-
pliant behavior, while maintaining its reputation as a responsi-
ble member of the international community by complying when 
necessary.330 
India may be pursuing a similar strategy. While its national 
solar mission was found to be in violation of WTO agreements in 
2016, the US raised a request in January 2018 for an Article 21.5 
decision, claiming that two years after the AB decision, India 
had not brought its program into compliance with WTO Agree-
ments.331 India appears to be pursuing the same approach as the 
US has in the US–Countervailing Duty case, and as China did in 
China–Wind—by delaying compliance until developmental and 
environmental goals have been largely achieved. Attempts by In-
dia to rely on international climate treaties and energy access 
and energy poverty issues as an environmental or developmen-
tal defense under Articles XX(d) and (j) failed under WTO law. 
India is strategically avoiding compliance in order to gain the 
maximum environmental and developmental benefits of its na-
tional solar program. 
There is also a notable absence of the mention of climate 
mitigation in these disputes, apart from India’s emphasis on the 
UNFCCC and Rio+20.332 The atmosphere would most likely form 
part of natural resources protected under Article XX(g),333 even 
if renewable energy is being exported outside of national bor-
ders. In addition, India’s National Solar Mission policy does not 
focus on the health implications of climate change, and the role 
that renewable energy can play in the reduction of pollution but 
also the access to energy. Energy poverty can lead to disease, 
gender inequality, and even death. As a result, diffusing renew-
able energy in rural areas could improve life expectancy, bring-
ing the policy within the ambit of both Articles XX(b) and XX(g). 
In the biofuels disputes, both Argentina and Indonesia were 
successful in their anti-dumping disputes against the EU under 
 
 330. Oh, supra note 239, at 1141 (describing how China’s “pattern of conven-
ient compliance allows Beijing not only to achieve its economic developmental 
goals through measures that flout WTO rules, but also to improve its reputation 
as a responsible member of the international community”). 
 331. Request for the Establishment of a Panel, India–Certain Measures Re-
lating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules–Recourse to article 21.5, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS456/20 (Jan. 29, 2018). 
 332. But cf. Brazil–Taxation, supra note 91 (describing how taxation in the 
automotive industry addressed climate mitigation goals). 
 333. See discussion, supra Part I. 
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WTO law. This is in part due to the fact that export duties are 
not disciplined by the WTO under these agreements, and this 
has been a successful strategy in the disputes to date, in part. In 
October 2017, the EU informed the WTO that it had adopted Im-
plementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1578 to fully implement the 
AB’s decision regarding Argentinian soybeans.334 While Argen-
tina welcomed this development, it also expressed its serious 
concern with the European Biodiesel Board’s intention to peti-
tion the European Commission to initiate a subsidy investiga-
tion of Argentinian biofuel imports in order to avoid cheaper im-
ports from Argentina and Indonesia due to the lowering of ADA 
duties under (EU) 2017/1578.335 In relation to the second dis-
pute, on March 1, 2018, the EU and Indonesia informed the 
WTO that they had agreed to a reasonable period for the EU to 
implement the Panel’s decision as 8 months, expiring on October 
28 2018.336 However, in 2017, a decision was taken by the US 
Department of Commerce to impose large anti-dumping duties 
on biofuel imports from both Argentina and Indonesia, effec-
tively protecting US biofuel producers.337 In 2016, Peru imposed 
antidumping duties on Argentinian biofuels, and Argentina has 
submitted a request for consultations with Peru.338 As a result, 
disputes over biofuels are likely to continue. 
With many developing countries containing the world’s larg-
est stores of raw materials, they can be perceived as the new 
“Renewable Superpowers.”339 These countries may even form an 
 
 334. Panel Report, European Union–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel 
from Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS473/Add.4 (Oct. 13, 2017). 
 335. See Meghan Sapp, European Biodiesel Board Preparing to Launch Anti-
Subsidy Case Against Argentina, BIOFUELS DIG. (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2017/09/28/european-biodiesel-board-
preparing-to-launch-anti-subsidy-case-against-argentina/ (discussing the de-
sire of the EBB to launch an investigation). 
 336. Agreement, European Union–Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel 
from Indonesia, WTO Doc. WT/DS480/7 (Mar. 1, 2018). 
 337. Jim Lane, US Slaps Argentine, Indonesian Biodiesel Producers with 
Huge Anti-Dumping Penalties, BIOFUELS DIG. (Aug. 23, 2017), http://www.bio-
fuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2017/08/23/us-slaps-argentine-indonesian-biodiesel-
producers-with-huge-anti-dumping-penalties. 
 338. Request for Consultations by Argentina, Peru-Anti-dumping and Coun-
tervailing Measures on Biodiesel for Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS572/1 (Dec. 5, 
2018). 
 339. See Andrew Barron, Meet the New “Renewable Superpowers”: Nations 
That Boss the Materials Used for Wind and Solar, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 19, 
2018), https://theconversation.com/meet-the-new-renewable-superpowers-na-
tions-that-boss-the-materials-used-for-wind-and-solar-91680 (discussing the 
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“OPEC for Renewables,”340 signaling that global wrangling for 
dominance in these new industries is likely to continue. The 
largely negative outcomes for developing countries in energy dis-
putes means that they are likely to continue to employ strategic 
compliance approaches. Given the potential role of developing 
countries in the global expansion of renewables, this may not be 
all bad given the seeming inability of the DSM at the moment to 
take into account the urgency of the climate crisis. This is due to 
the WTO’s emphasis on reducing protectionism and stressing 
non-discrimination in trade relationships—rules which to date 
have largely benefited industrialized developed countries. 
Existing trade disciplines under the WTO fail to take into 
account development trajectories and energy access issues of de-
veloping countries, but also fail to cater for the climate mitiga-
tion impacts of domestic policies. Neither the WTO nor the DSM 
was established to cater comprehensively for non-trade con-
cerns, and policy space provided by Article XX was always antic-
ipated to be strongly trade oriented. Through the multilateral 
trading system, wealthy nations “have carved out a multilateral 
order which best suits their own development trajectory.”341 
OECD countries have used high-technology capacities and inno-
vative technologies as the foundation of their national prosper-
ity.342 Member states which are seeking to build an industry or 
an export advantage will find scope to maneuver severely disci-
plined and conditioned by multilateral agreements such as the 
SCM Agreement or TRIMS.343 Developing countries have 
 
countries who will become the new “renewable superpowers” if and when de-
mand for fossil fuel production resources switches to production elements for 
renewables). 
 340. Id. (analyzing the implications of a hypothetical scenario where renew-
able resource rich countries form a coalition like OPEC). 
 341. Linda Weiss, Global Governance, National Strategies: How Industrial-
ized States Make Room to Move Under the WTO, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 723, 
724 (2005). 
 342. Id. at 730–31 (“The point being made is that the key instruments for 
developing knowledge-based industries are not those targeted directly at the 
development of productive capacity, but rather at the formation of high-tech 
capabilities, and innovative technologies. It is the latter that OECD govern-
ments now view as the foundation for securing national prosperity and that the 
WTO rules readily accommodate.”). 
 343. Id. at 726. 
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remained primarily exporters of natural resources.344 As a re-
sult, traditional trading patterns reflect the export of commodi-
ties and natural resources by developing countries, and the im-
port of technology and services.345 By intertwining development 
and environmental policies, developing countries are attempting 
to scale the value chain, and avoid the “Dutch disease”; increased 
revenues from natural resources can de-industrialize a nation’s 
economy by raising the exchange rate and thereby make its man-
ufacturing sector less competitive.346 This can trap developing 
countries into a state of “underdevelopment” due to overreliance 
on natural resource exports.347 
Large developing countries such as China and India are at-
tempting to break these traditional trade patterns by processing 
raw materials and minerals before export,348 attempting a “col-
lective correction by developing countries to their past develop-
ment path.”349 Production taxes or quotas can be the first-best 
policy instrument to address this, but risks what the WTO has 
called “natural resource nationalism” and “beggar thy neigh-
bour” trading asymmetries.350 Developing countries have at-
tempted to address this issue through policies which combine 
both environmental considerations as well as domestic protec-
tionism.351 These policies have largely been declared 
 
 344. Bin Gu, Mineral Export Restraints and Sustainable Development – Are 
Rare Earths Testing the WTO’s Loopholes?, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 765, 768–69 
(2011). 
 345. Id. 
 346. WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2010: TRADE IN NATURAL 
RESOURCES, 9 (2010). 
 347. Id. at 68. 
 348. GU, supra note 344, at 781. 
 349. Id. 
 350. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 346, at 5, 42. 
 351. The infant industry literature has mixed approaches to the success of 
domestic protection policies. Some authors have stated that the infant industry 
argument is well respected and legitimate temporary protection measure for 
use in emerging sectors in developing countries in order to allow for a temporary 
period of learning-by-doing. See Gene M. Grossman & Henrik Horn, Infant-In-
dustry Protection Reconsidered: The Case of Informational Barriers to Entry, 
103 Q. J. ECON. 767, 767 (1988); Takashi Negishi, Protection of the Infant In-
dustry and Dynamic Internal Economies, ECON. REC. 56, 56 (1968); Bruce 
Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiligtz, Helping Infant Economies Grow: Foundations 
of Trade Policies for Developing Countries, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 141, 146 (2006). 
But see Kevin Rask, Evidence of the Empirical Relevance of the Infant Industry 
Argument for the Protection of Brazilian Ethanol Production, 10 AGRIC. ECON. 
245, 246 (1994) (finding no empirical evidence that infant-industry protections 
2020] RENEWABLE ENERGY AND TRADE 69 
 
incompatible with WTO rules through energy disputes. In the 
trade context, failures by developing countries in energy dis-
putes are not surprising where the disputes revolve around 
green industrial policies. 
As these disputes move into their trade remedy phases, it 
seems that developing countries are choosing to retain their 
green industrial policies and adopt strategic or convenient com-
pliance approaches to WTO rulings, or looking for WTO loop-
holes or inconsistencies,352 particularly where they do not feel 
their domestic goals under the policies have been achieved. This 
has been demonstrated in the China–Wind and India–Solar dis-
putes.353 Prompt compliance results only when developmental 
aims have been achieved, as illustrated in the China–Wind con-
sultations. The lack of involvement of small- or medium-sized 
developing countries as either complainant or respondent in 
these disputes confirms this trend. These countries tend not to 
be as active in the DSM, and even if they were, it is only large 
developing countries that can afford to engage in strategic com-
pliance strategies. 
Developed countries appear to be adopting similar protec-
tionist approaches, particularly in the US–Countervailing Du-
ties and biofuels disputes, caving to pressure from their own do-
mestic industries.354 Under the biofuels disputes, developing 
countries are therefore being denied access to markets even 
when their domestic policies are WTO-compliant.355 There is not 
much that can be done about this behavior except to pursue 
trade remedies at the international level or attempt to resolve 
the issue through diplomacy. It appears, then, that where coun-
tries can afford to withstand the imposition of trade remedies, 
 
helped the Brazilian biofuel industry); Arvind Panagariya, A Re-examination of 
the Infant Industry Argument for Protection, 5 J. APPLIED ECON. RES. 7, 13 
(2011) (arguing that, even with this approach, later market entrants still enjoy 
competitive advantages); Robert E. Baldwin, The Case Against Infant-Industry 
Tariff Protection, 77 J. POL. ECON. 295, 295 (1969) (arguing that the approach 
would not induce domestic firms to invest in innovation); Nisar Ahmed, Com-
petitive Strength of Nations: Doing Business in a Global Market, 1 EURASIAN J. 
BUS. MGMT. 41, 43 (2013) (arguing that infant industry protection hampers do-
mestic firms’ future growth). 
 352. Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 461. 
 353. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 354. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 355. Id. 
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they will choose to retain trade-inconsistent clean energy poli-
cies—at least until they have achieved domestic aims. 
In the short term, a strategic compliance approach may be 
beneficial for the climate if developing countries use this policy 
space to increase the domestic manufacture and diffusion of re-
newable energy technology that has climate benefits. It is widely 
acknowledged that China’s domestic industrial approach to 
clean energy technology such as solar and wind has been respon-
sible for the reduction in price of these technologies globally, 
leading to price parity with fossil fuels.356 This development can 
only be positive for global climate stabilization goals. However, 
China is a unique player due to its scale and size, and not all 
protectionist policies are good for the climate. For example, the 
climate benefits of biofuels have been hotly contested. Protec-
tionist biofuels measures adopted by developed countries—
where domestic policies of developing countries are WTO-com-
pliant but climate-unfriendly—may also be beneficial. 
In the long term, however, more synergy between the trade 
and climate regimes should be found. Trade remedies in re-
sponse to multilateral disputes can include tariff increases and 
other trade-restrictive measures in order to counter the alleged 
injury caused by a subsidy. Other parties could take unilateral 
action as well in the face of a stasis at the DSM.357 Recent pro-
tectionist policies by the US through import tariffs are antici-
pated to increase the price of solar panels.358 It is estimated that 
between 2008–2012, trade remedies affected US $32 billion 
worth of trade in green products.359 Unilaterally imposed anti-
dumping or countervailing duties to counter domestic subsidies 
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 359. Meléndez-Ortiz & Sugathan, supra note 198, at 113. 
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lead to more expensive products and import barriers,360 and so a 
stable and fair trading system in renewable energy which has 
demonstrated climate benefits is needed in the longer term. In 
the longer term, synergy between the WTO and the goals of the 
Paris Agreement would lead to a more cohesive and mutually 
supportive global trade and climate strategy. 
VI. FUTURE STRATEGIES: A TWO-STEP 
JURISPRUDENTIAL ADVANCE 
As the climate crisis increases, global imperatives such as 
climate mitigation may either regulate how WTO norms are ap-
plied or in some cases even displace those norms.361 This move-
ment has yet to occur based on the current set of energy disputes 
analyzed. While the DSM did incorporate customary interna-
tional law in some disputes, it did so narrowly, and almost dis-
counted the importance of the UNFCCC regime in its interpre-
tive approaches.362 Alternative approaches are available and set 
out below. In the longer term, it will be important for the WTO 
to both engage in legislative reform and adopt climate-compati-
ble approaches to Article XX. While legislative reform such as 
adding a no-action category of subsidies under the SCM Agree-
ment, or political decisions through a climate waiver would be a 
much more comprehensive approach, they may be politically un-
feasible to achieve in the short term. Given the required urgent 
emissions mitigation, and the need for dramatically scaled up 
action in the next decade, a twofold jurisprudential approach is 
suggested below as a partial solution. 
A. STEP ONE: RELYING ON AND REINTERPRETING ARTICLE XX 
Energy and trade are two separate regimes, and a future 
framework agreement on energy at the WTO would provide far 
more legal coherence in this area.363 Given the current lackluster 
progress of the Doha Development Round, a new trade 
 
 360. The use of countervailing and antidumping duties is widespread, even 
though subsidized imported products would be cheaper for consumers within 
those nations. See Jackson, supra note 34, at 281; see also supra, Part II. 
 361. Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis, Renewable Energy Disputes in the 
World Trade Organization, 13 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L.J., 3, 11 (2015). 
 362. See supra Part V.A (discussing disputes where the DSM found 
measures in violation of trade rules despite their potential importance to cli-
mate change). 
 363. Cottier et al., supra note 189, at 3. 
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agreement is unlikely to be agreed anytime soon. A number of 
authors have suggested a “climate waiver” or the re-introduction 
of non-actionable subsidies under the SCM Agreement, and the 
successful conclusion of the EGA negotiations.364 Member states 
can adopt an authoritative interpretation of provisions of the 
WTO Agreements, for example, in a declaration that measures 
taken pursuant to the Paris Agreement would fall within the 
scope of Article XX, or negotiate a “peace clause” providing a 
cooling off period before challenging national climate 
measures.365 Farah and Gima suggest the incorporation of a sun-
set clause or period of transition to allow developing countries to 
achieve a level of development in clean energy fields.366 These 
strategies would all provide a more comprehensive approach to 
trade and climate change and may be successful if global priority 
and attention is focused on reinvigorating the WTO. However, 
given the current stasis of legislative reform at the WTO, it may 
take some time to reach political agreement. In the interim, a 
jurisprudential approach may be an appropriate stop-gap and 
raise the profile of climate change as both an important and le-
gitimate policy objective of the WTO.367 
Reliance on Article XX by developing countries has been 
wholly unsuccessful in these energy disputes since 2010, and not 
all defenses available under Article XX were used by these coun-
tries.368 In addition, DSM interpretations of these provisions 
have excluded issues of sovereignty, health, or development, and 
narrowed interpretations of Article XX. Public health concerns 
under Article XX(b), which are traditionally afforded a large 
dose of respect by the DSM, were unsuccessful in these disputes. 
 
 364. See BACCHUS, supra note 122, at 10; Meléndez-Ortiz & Sugathan, supra 
note 198; Joachim Monkelbaan, Using Trade for Achieving the SDGs: The Ex-
ample of the Environmental Goods Agreement, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 575, 598–99 
(2017). 
 365. Droege et al., supra note 13, at 36–37. 
 366. Paolo Davide Farah & Elena Gima, WTO and Renewable Energy: Les-
sons from the Case Law, 49 J. WORLD TRADE 1103, 1116 (2015). 
 367. Dent argues that re-evaluation of international norms of state inter-
vention in the realm of clean energy trade should be a priority for the WTO, 
given its global implications. Supra note 12, at 740. Doelle argues that the cli-
mate mitigation impacts of clean energy policies should be given priority by the 
WTO, given the global implications of climate change. See Meinhard Doelle, 
Climate Change and the WTO: Opportunities to Motivate State Action on Cli-
mate Change Through the WTO, 13 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENV’T L. 85 
(2004). 
 368. See supra Part V. 
2020] RENEWABLE ENERGY AND TRADE 73 
 
Regulatory autonomy for the transition to renewable energy un-
der Article XX(d) was disregarded given the lack of specificity 
and bindingness in both international and domestic law. Green 
industrial policy was too protectionist to be favored under Article 
XX(g), which was confined to environmental conservation 
only.369 Finally, the DSM was not amenable to energy access and 
energy poverty arguments under Article XX(j).370 A number of 
approaches are suggested below which could be adopted by de-
veloping countries under these subcategories to overcome these 
obstacles. 
1. Article XX(b) 
It is possible that connecting local content requirements or 
other protectionist measures to overall policy objectives of reduc-
ing cost and increasing (local) dissemination of renewable en-
ergy, combined with the economic and poverty eradication im-
peratives and air quality crises in many developing countries, 
could be persuasive in the interpretation of Article XX(b). Em-
pirical evidence connecting the economic elements of a domestic 
policy to increased manufacturing and dissemination of renewa-
ble energy technology would have to be put forward, and combat 
any other economic arguments such as that simply importing 
cheap renewable energy technology may achieve the same do-
mestic policy objectives. 
Public health concerns were not raised by either India or 
China in the context of climate change in these disputes. This is 
surprising as both of these countries are struggling with high 
pollution levels primarily due to the burning of fossil fuels.371 
The transition to clean energy could be cited in domestic policy 
documents as contributing to the resolution of mounting public 
health concerns, particularly air pollution, with the requisite 
data and empirical connections to both health concerns and 
 
 369. See supra Part IV. 
 370. Id. 
 371. However, in the China–Rare Earths dispute, China did attempt to use 
public health concerns regarding pollution levels in the mining of rare earth, 
but this argument was given short shrift by the Panel under Article XX(b), per-
haps due to the concern by the Panel of lack of domestic action to conserve rare 
earth minerals. China’s domestic minerals policy was not specific enough re-
garding the link between export restraints and conservation and reduction of 
pollution. However, it is curious that domestic production cuts were not suffi-
ciently linked by the Panel to Article XX(b). See China–Rare Earths, supra note 
110, at ¶ 5.116. 
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reduced emissions provided. Rich jurisprudence in both the Bra-
zil–Retreaded Tyres and EC-Asbestos372 disputes provides coun-
tries with large policy discretion when it comes to public health 
priorities, provided comprehensive domestic objectives are 
clearly articulated and carefully linked to justify any trade-re-
strictive elements. This avenue could provide more policy space 
to developing countries in the context of climate change if spe-
cific links are made to domestic health concerns. These health 
issues could also be linked to energy access and energy poverty 
issues, providing a multi-layered approach to justify increasing 
the diffusion of renewable energy. 
The applicability of Article XX(b) requires a reference to how 
measures are linked to environmental or public health objec-
tives, and general references to these objectives are unlikely to 
be successful without more detailed domestic policies on emis-
sions and pollution reduction, as well as data linking fossil fuel 
use to air pollution and associated respiratory diseases.373 If 
countries do this, limited room to maneuver could be opened up 
through the employment of public health considerations due to 
climate change and air pollution. Given historic policy space pro-
vided to countries in the realm of public health, if argued ro-
bustly Article XX(b) may provide some relief—provided the tests 
in the chapeau can be cleared.374 
2. Articles XX(d) and XX(j) 
These energy disputes also provide legal interpretations of 
a number of provisions under both Article XX(d) and XX(j). In 
the India–Solar dispute, the DSM demonstrated limited concern 
for energy access and energy sustainability considerations under 
these provisions.375 Arguments regarding energy poverty and/or 
climate change in the context of Article XX(j) were not consid-
ered. Energy access arguments were considered, but only briefly 
by the Panel. Arguably energy poverty issues are folded into en-
ergy access, but the Panel provided scant attention to this argu-
ment and the need for access to clean energy for development 
purposes. Instead, the Panel focused on trade concerns, unable 
 
 372. See supra Part II. 
 373. Ruth Jebe, Don Mayer & Yong-Shik Lee, China’s Export Restrictions of 
Raw Materials and Rare Earths: A New Balance Between Free Trade and Envi-
ronmental Protection?, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 579, 617 (2013). 
 374. See supra Part II. 
 375. See supra Part V.A.3. 
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to find a link between reduced domestic production of renewable 
energy and reduced imports. As such, the Panel concluded that 
India’s green industrial policy was as much about boosting do-
mestic industry as it was about filling growing domestic energy 
demand. 
In that dispute, the DSM was not willing to consider inter-
national climate change agreements as qualifying under Article 
XX(d) without a specific degree of bindingness of renewable en-
ergy provisions. Hortatory, domestic policy-based language was 
clearly not sufficient to qualify under Article XX(d). This require-
ment of “hard normativity” by the DSM ignores the soft law ele-
ments of the climate change governance regime, including the 
Paris Agreement, and its emphasis on nationally determined 
contributions and progression of national ambition on climate 
change mitigation targets over time. Accelerated action under 
the Paris Agreement is likely to trigger more trade law chal-
lenges to domestic policy making without sufficient recourse to 
Article XX.376 In this regard, developing countries should con-
sider tighter, legally binding language in national policies or cli-
mate legislation, with closer and more explicit links to climate 
change and their nationally determined contributions regarding 
clean energy transitions, with discretion provided to cater for en-
ergy poverty issues in order to provide stronger normativity, tar-
gets, and action at the domestic level. Article XX(d) may also 
provide some assistance if developing countries are willing to 
tighten the language of domestic policy directives and legisla-
tion, linking clean energy policies more directly to public health, 
domestic environmental concerns, and nationally determined 
contributions under the Paris Agreement. 
3. Article XX(g) 
As the interpretation of the XX(g) disputes illustrates, it is 
likely that the atmosphere would qualify as an exhaustible nat-
ural resource under Article XX(g), and a climate policy aimed at 
conservation of a human, plant or animal species would also 
qualify under Article XX(g).377 Therefore, this exception could 
 
 376. BODANSKY ET. AL., supra note 45, at 348. 
 377. Id., at 333 (arguing that in light of past panel decisions, the “global cli-
mate itself” could qualify as an exhaustible natural resource); see also Appellate 
Body Report, US–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted May 20, 1996) (affording policies to reduce 
the depletion of clean air protection under GATT XX(g)). 
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provide developing countries with considerable policy space to 
implement green industrial policies, provided they have empiri-
cally demonstrable climate benefits. There may be some obsta-
cles to this approach, though, which would require strict mitiga-
tion of emissions domestically to meet the even-handedness 
requirement as set forth by the DSM. This corollary domestic 
activity could be activity which is articulated in a country’s na-
tionally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement,378 
which is designed to be updated in five-year cycles, demonstrat-
ing progressive domestic reduction of greenhouse gases. Imple-
mentation of progressive nationally determined contributions 
domestically could demonstrate that any renewable energy pol-
icy is designed to work in tandem to achieve domestic emissions 
reductions, fulfilling the “even-handedness” approach. 
Domestic measures and policies were scrutinized by the 
DSM to determine whether they met the even-handedness re-
quirement under Article XX(g).379 While parity between foreign 
and domestic measures may not be necessary, some activity on 
the domestic front towards conservation will be necessary to 
qualify for Article XX(g). This could be achieved through closer 
integration between, say, the establishment of production quo-
tas and export duties and the direct application of export duties 
or license fees to environmental conservation and remediation. 
The DSM has narrowly confined the application of Article XX(g) 
to conservation-only measures. As currently interpreted, the de-
velopment of green industrial policies which seek a broader de-
velopment scope beyond conservation are unlikely to be palata-
ble to the DSM without this being raised at the appellate body 
level in the future, and more deference provided to well de-
signed, climate-friendly domestic policies. Green industrial poli-
cies with domestic economic elements and an export focus are 
unlikely to succeed, given recent jurisprudence under Article 
XX(g), unless stringent domestic measures are also undertaken. 
This approach could align with the Article XX(d) strategy sug-
gested above, with progressive domestic emissions reductions 
combined with strict environmental procedures implemented do-
mestically. Linking environmental export tariffs directly to fund 
environmental remediation and clean energy policies may also 
illicit more positive consideration by the DSM. 
 
 378. Paris Agreement, supra note 4. 
 379. See supra Part I.C. 
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B. STEP TWO: DSM RE-INTERPRETING ARTICLE XX EXCEPTIONS 
WITH A CLIMATE LENS 
The recommendations outlined above all have sweeping do-
mestic costs and regulatory implications for developing coun-
tries, and movement cannot only be one way on this issue. The 
DSM should reconsider the applicability of Article XX in the con-
text of climate change. This may require a re-interpretation of 
its application, in particular the chapeau, in the context of coun-
tries’ legitimate efforts to implement domestic climate policies. 
This will be important to retain the legitimacy of the WTO gen-
erally, and in particular in playing a role to address the climate 
crisis. Whether these countries demonstrate an appetite to cater 
their domestic landscapes more closely to trade compliance, or 
simply continue with strategic or non-compliant behavior to 
achieve their green industrial policy goals, remains to be seen. 
The outcome of energy disputes to date indicates strategic non-
compliance is the more likely outcome, unless more progressive 
interpretation of Article XX is undertaken at the DSM. 
1. Article XX Chapeau 
Despite the suggested strategies, even if a measure succeeds 
under a sub-provision of Article XX, it must still prevail under 
the chapeau test, which contains strict guidance on trade dis-
torting elements of a measure.380 These recent energy disputes 
demonstrate that no matter the environmental objective or ef-
fect, as long as a policy violates a trade obligation, the environ-
mental policy will likely encounter some issues under the cha-
peau.381 
Given the DSM’s preference for multilateralism when inter-
preting the requirements of the chapeau, it is possible that the 
multilateral arrangements, including nationally determined 
contributions under the Paris Agreement,382 may be considered 
by the DSM as legitimate policy making on climate change. Ne-
gotiation of the Paris Agreement took many years (arguably dec-
ades), and its provisions, although largely soft law, should qual-
ify as “serious, good faith efforts” to reach an understanding on 
 
 380. See supra Part I.D. 
 381. Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 405–06. 
 382. Paris Agreement, supra note 4. 
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multilateral approaches to combat climate change.383 In addi-
tion, parties are subject to stringent transparency requirements 
regarding the development and submission of their nationally 
determined contributions under the Paris Agreement,384 which 
should provide the degree of transparency emphasized by the 
Appellate Body when interpreting the chapeau. Provided domes-
tic energy policies fall in line with a country’s nationally deter-
mined contribution (which are to be updated in five-year cycles), 
multinational negotiations which agreed to and periodically re-
viewed these contributions should be sufficient to pass the test 
of the chapeau. However, while some progressive interpretation 
of the chapeau has come before,385 and robust arguments could 
be put forward about the multilateral negotiations under the 
Paris Agreement meeting the procedural elements of the cha-
peau, any trade distorting element of a renewable energy policy 
may struggle to survive the chapeau. 
Policy space for developing countries to scale the value chain 
in clean energy is therefore not likely to be tolerated by the DSM 
with current interpretive approaches to Article XX. This is not a 
real difficulty for the environment as the trade distorting ele-
ments of these policies can be separated from the environmental 
aspects.386 However, this approach may cause difficulties for 
some developing countries, depending on their fiscal situations, 
and developing countries may want to use protectionist 
measures to grow and expand their industries. This may partic-
ularly be the case with export duties which can provide direct 
 
 383. Cf. US–Shrimp Art. 21.5, supra note 117, at ⁋153 (upholding a previ-
ously invalidated trade measure as the responsible party was involved in “seri-
ous good faith negotiations” with the other parties involved); Mehling et al. su-
pra note 92, at 468–69 (noting, however, in relation to the element of the 
chapeau which prohibits a measure from discriminating against countries 
where the same conditions apply, that comparing different climate policies is 
vexing, and that given the principle of common but differentiated responsibili-
ties and respective capabilities under the Paris Agreement and special and dif-
ferential treatment under the WTO, special considerations should be applied to 
Least Developed Countries, although these latitudes are not likely to be given 
to emerging economies, the subject of this paper). 
 384. See Paris Agreement, supra note 4, art. 13 (describing the transparency 
framework). 
 385. See US–Shrimp Art. 21.5, supra note 117, at ¶¶ 140–148 (affirming the 
argument that practices and procedures which are “comparable in effective-
ness” meet the “essentially the same” standard). 
 386. Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 407 (noting instead that the real 
danger to green policies lies with increasing unilateral trade measures at the 
domestic level). 
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financial benefits, including increasing the financial capacity of 
the government for environmental remediation.387 Fiscal con-
straints in developing countries may lead them to dump costly 
environmental policies without domestic protection mechanisms 
and direct development gains.388 Increased domestic develop-
ment of clean technologies in a country the size of China can 
have international positive spillover effects through climate mit-
igation, which strict environmental policies divorced from devel-
opment gains could undermine.389 
Climate change mitigation considerations barely figured in 
these energy disputes, and climate change itself was not men-
tioned at all by the DSM, illustrating its focus only on trade dis-
torting measures.390 This indicates that alternative interpreta-
tions of the chapeau of Article XX would also have to be adopted 
by the DSM, taking into account the urgency of climate change. 
Some general principles and interpretive approaches could be 
adopted by the DSM. In the first instance, climate change could 
be considered by the DSM as a legitimate policy imperative, 
which in some circumstances could balance or negate any trade 
distorting measure. A more balanced approach giving equal con-
sideration to both the climate protection effects of measures and 
trade discrimination could be adopted by the DSM. As articu-
lated in Part I above, the DSM regularly adopts weighing and 
balancing tests when assessing the appropriateness of domestic 
policies in the context of trade rules and discriminatory treat-
ment. Secondly, where a domestic policy has overwhelming cli-
mate benefits which significantly outweigh any discriminatory 
treatment (even through export), the DSM should allow it. This 
may require more comprehensive analysis on the impacts of 
measures both in terms of climate benefits (arguably more diffi-
cult to assess in the export context) and trade distortive impacts. 
In order to do this, a different interpretive approach to the 
chapeau of Article XX needs to be adopted which harkens back 
to older and more progressive interpretations adopted by the 
 
 387. Id. at 426–428 (explaining that China’s export duties incentivize local 
industry to exploit recourses, which in turn expands a tax base that could the-
oretically be used for environmental remediation). 
 388. Id. at 462 (“Those facing tighter fiscal constraints would be more in-
clined to jettison costly environmental programs without offsetting economic 
gains.”). 
 389. Id. 
 390. See e.g. India–Solar, supra note 259; supra Part IV.A.3. 
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DSM in environmental disputes.391 Trade distortive measures, 
provided they are closely connected to legitimate climate policy 
objectives, should be assessed for their climate-legitimacy and 
allowed where there are clear, demonstrated climate benefits. In 
this balancing test, the DSM would provide deference to legiti-
mate climate policy making which has demonstrated health and 
environmental effects. In order to do this, more climate and en-
ergy experts need to be appointed on to the Panels and Appellate 
Bodies. The DSM has a history of progressive interpretive ap-
proaches to Article XX, giving due deference to coherent and 
comprehensive domestic policies in the areas of public health 
and natural resource conservation.392 This interpretive approach 
should be applied to domestic climate and energy policies, par-
ticularly when they are clearly and cogently applied, and empir-
ically proven to support public health, resource conservation, 
and climate aims. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This decade will be a critical one for the efficacy of the mul-
tilateral trading system, at least in the short term, as well as for 
the Paris Agreement.393 If the WTO is undermined due to stasis 
at the appellate body level, it is likely that countries will revert 
to strategic compliance and protectionist measures, as well as 
rely on bilateral or regional trade agreements where they exist. 
If the WTO is revived in the future, its approach to climate 
change should be significantly revamped. In moments of disrup-
tion and crisis there is opportunity for significant change and 
transitional relief.394 There is no doubt that we are now facing a 
 
 391. See Wu & Salzman, supra note 137, at 405 (discussing the “‘[c]lassic’ 
trade and environmental disputes” Tuna/Dolphin and Shrimp/Turtle). 
 392. See US–Shrimp, supra note 74, at ¶ 141 (arguing a regulation on 
shrimp imports should be interpreted in light of its environmental purpose of 
protecting sea turtles); US–Gasoline, supra note 85, at ¶¶ 6.21, 6.37 (interpret-
ing Article XX(b) broadly to include a rule intended to reduce gasoline emissions 
and classifying clean air as an exhaustible natural resource for Article XX(b)’s 
purposes). 
 393. The second round of nationally determined contributions are due in 
2020 and should demonstrate increased ambition on emissions reductions. 
 394. See Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. 
ENV’T. L. REV. 91, 94 (2011) (stating that in response to disruption, policy mak-
ers can choose between providing and withholding transitional relief for regu-
lated entities). 
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climate crisis, and the relationship between the WTO and the 
Paris Agreement needs to be significantly revised. 
Given the current inability of developing countries to rely on 
Article XX in energy disputes, their policy options are limited. In 
the short term, strategic compliance and the decline of multilat-
eralism could benefit emerging economies if they use this policy 
space to increase the manufacture and diffusion of renewable 
energy through policies which are well designed, properly imple-
mented, and have significant climate benefits. In the area of bio-
fuels, protectionist measures by developed countries are detri-
mental to emerging economies, but may not be to the climate 
where biofuel policies do not have climate benefits. 
In the longer term, if the WTO revives as the main trading 
arena, renewable energy disputes at the DSM are likely to esca-
late. Developing countries should tighten their domestic policies 
and rely on Article XX exceptions more effectively. The approach 
of the DSM and its interpretation of Article XX should also be 
revised. The WTO itself needs to have a stronger voice in areas 
of major global concern, including climate change.395 A stronger 
role of developing countries within the WTO is also key to its 
success.396 Adopting a more climate- and sustainable develop-
ment-friendly interpretation of Article XX provisions could 
achieve this dual goal and result in a strengthened WTO system 
which is better adapted to the sustainable development aims of 
many of its member states, as well as a progressive (instead of a 
regressive) position on the critical issue of climate change. 
“[T]rade can provide a catalyst for bringing together regulators, 
civil society, business, and energy industries to help shape do-
mestic decarbonization policies that meet climate mitigation 
goals . . . .”397 Developing countries are already an important la-
boratory for public policy and green growth, and existing strate-
gies show great potential for simultaneous inclusive green 
growth and environmental protection.398 Where these initiatives 
 
 395. KLASEN, supra note 47, at 82 (arguing that the WTO needs “to increase 
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 396. Id. at 80. 
 397. Elizabeth Trujillo, International Trade, in LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP 
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 398. Burkolter & Perch, supra note 148, at 253 (concluding that developing 
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“green growth efforts”). 
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have clear climate benefits, they should be fostered and encour-
aged by the WTO. 
